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“[...] our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one 
special type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, 
there lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life 
without suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they 
are there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere 
have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality can 
be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded.” 
 
William James (1902) The Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 388. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this doctoral thesis is to investigate altered states of consciousness (ASC) that 
are marked by hallucinations, occur during hypnosis, or are induced by psychedelic drugs. A 
multidisciplinary approach is used for enabling the integration of methods and results from various 
fields of human sciences, such as psychology and phenomenology. The included four studies focus on 
significant changes occurring in the human mind during deliberately induced, first-person reportable, 
non-ordinary subjective experiences. Theoretical issues concern the definition and classification of 
altered consciousness, while empirical research approaches the phenomena with an experimental 
study on hypnosis and sleepiness, and an online study on psychedelic drug use.  
Study I ("Hallucinatory Altered States of Consciousness") is a theoretical analysis that 
proposes a working definition of hallucinatory ASC based on objectively detectable and subjectively 
experienced changes in neurocognitive subsystems. To solve the 'selection–definition ordering 
problem' (i.e., whether to define ASC by selected phenomena, or to select phenomena as ASC by a 
definition), a stepwise operationalization procedure is also proposed. 
Study II ("Hypnotizability, Sleepiness, and Subjective Experience") describes an empirical 
hypnosis study in 90 subjects by using one newly developed and three previously established self-
rating scales. Results indicate that hypnotizability correlates positively with both habitual daytime 
sleepiness and instantaneous sleepiness after the hypnotic procedure, hence sleep and hypnosis may 
share common, putatively neurobiological mechanisms regarding transitions between ASC.  
Study III ("Coping, Life Purpose, and Spirituality in Psychedelic Drug Users") is based on an 
online questionnaire survey of 667 psychoactive drug users. Findings point out that psychedelic drug 
use may facilitate the gain of autognosis (self-knowledge) by rehearsing personal coping strategies in 
exceptional mental situations. As autognostic psychedelic drug use correlates positively with coping 
and spirituality, it may also act as a protective factor against drug-related problems. 
Study IV ("Sacramental and Spiritual Use of Hallucinogenic Drugs") is a commentary article 
arguing that sacramentally and spiritually used psychedelic drugs ('entheogens') are associated with a 
search of metaphysical insight rather than with a mere need to alter one’s perception. Therefore, ritual 
and ceremonial use of hallucinogenic drugs deserves its own category in a drug instrumentalization 
framework: "to facilitate spiritual and religious activities". 
The thesis utilizes the overarching concept of virtual realism, stating that phenomenal-level 
consciousness manifests as a world-simulator by which the mind–brain complex experiences its own 
virtual information processing as subjective reality. Hence, deliberate manipulation of the experience 
set and setting parameters by psychologically, pharmacologically, and technologically induced 
hallucinatory ASC can be a naturally integrable and effective method to extend human consciousness. 
 Keywords: consciousness; altered states of consciousness; hallucinations; drowsiness; 
hypnosis; psychedelic drugs; subjective experience; virtual reality 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tohtorinväitöskirjani tutkii hallusinaatioihin liittyviä, hypnoosin aikana tapahtuvia, tai 
psykedeelisten aineiden aikaansaamia muuttuneita tajunnantiloja (MTT). Aihetta lähestytään 
ihmistieteiden eri alojen, kuten psykologian ja fenomenologian, menetelmiä ja tuloksia yhdistävästä 
monitieteisestä näkökulmasta. Sisällytetyt neljä tutkimusta keskittyvät ihmismielen merkittäviin 
muutoksiin tahallisesti aikaansaatujen, omasta näkökulmasta kerrottujen, epätavallisten 
subjektiivisten kokemusten aikana. Teoreettisina aiheina ovat MTT:n määritelmä ja luokitus, käytännön 
tutkimukset lähestyvät ilmiöitä niin kokeellisen hypnoosi- ja uneliaisuustutkimuksen kuin myös 
psykedeelisten aineiden käyttöä kartoittavan internet-tutkimuksen menetelmin. 
Tutkimus n:o 1 ("Hallusinatoriset MTT-t") on teoreettinen analyysi, jossa ehdotetaan 
neurokognitiivisten alajärjestelmien muutosten objektiivisen havaitsemiseen ja subjektiivisen 
kokemiseen perustuva MTT-työmääritelmä. Artikkeli ehdottaa myös askeleittaisen operationalisointi-
menettelytavan, jolla ratkeaa ns. 'valinta–määritys -järjestysongelma' (eli valitaanko ensin MTT-ilmiöitä 
MTT-käsitteen määritystä varten, vai määritelläänkö ensin MTT-käsite MTT-ilmiöiden valintaa varten). 
Tutkimus n:o 2 ("Hypnoosiherkkyys, uneliaisuus, ja subjektiivinen kokemus") on 90 henkilön 
kokemusperäinen hypnoositutkimus, jossa käytetään yhtä uutta ja kolmea vakiintunutta 
itsearviointimittaria. Tulokset osoittavat, että hypnoosiherkkyys korreloi positiivisesti sekä 
tavanomaisen päiväuneliaisuuden että hypnoosin jälkeisen välittömän uneliaisuuden kanssa, mikä 
viitannee unen ja hypnoosin yhteisiin neurobiologisiin mekanismeihin MTT:jen välisissä siirtymisissä. 
Tutkimus n:o 3 ("Hallinta, tarkoitus, ja henkisyys psykedeelisten aineiden käyttäjillä") perustuu 
psykoaktiivisten aineiden 667 käyttäjän internet-kyselyyn. Löydökset osoittavat, että psykedeelisten 
aineiden käyttö voi edistää itsetuntemusta harjoittamalla henkilökohtaisia hallintatoimintoja mielen 
poikkeuksellisissa tilanteissa. Tiedostava psykedeelisten aineiden käyttö korreloi positiivisesti hallinnan 
ja henkisyyden kanssa toimien suojatekijänä aineidenkäytön ongelmia vastaan. 
Tutkimus n:o 4 ("Hallusinogeenien sakramentaalinen ja hengellinen käyttö") on kommentti-
artikkeli, jonka mukaan sakramentaalisesti ja hengellisesti käytetyt psykedeelit (enteogeenit) liittyvät 
pikemminkin metafyysisten oivallusten etsintään kuin pelkkään havaitsemisen muuttamistarpeeseen. 
Täten hallusinogeenien rituaalinen ja seremoniallinen käyttö ansaitsee oman kategoriansa aineiden 
instrumentalisaation viitekehyksessä: "hengellisten ja uskonnollisten toimintojen edesauttaminen". 
Teos hyödyntää virtuaalisen realismin käsitettä, jonka mukaan fenomenaalisen tason tajunta 
ilmenee maailma-simulaattorina, jolla mieli–aivot -kokonaisuus kokee oman virtuaalisen 
tiedonkäsittelynsä subjektiivisena todellisuutena. Kokemusten set ja setting -muuttujien tahallinen 
manipulointi psykologisesti, farmakologisesti, ja teknologisesti aikaansaatujen hallusinatoristen 
MTT:jen avulla voi olla luontaisesti yhdistettävä ja tehokas menetelmä ihmistajunnan laajentamiseksi. 
 Avainsanat: tajunta; muuttuneet tajunnantilat; hallusinaatiot; uneliaisuus; hypnoosi; 
psykedeeliset aineet; subjektiivinen kokemus; virtuaalitodellisuus 
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8 Abbreviations  
ABBREVIATIONS 
AR augmented reality 
ASC altered state(s) of consciousness 
DMT N,N-dimethyltryptamine 
EEG electroencephalography 
ESS Epworth Sleepiness Scale 
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging 
HGSHS:A Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility Form A 
ISS Intrinsic Spirituality Scale 
KSS Karolinska Sleepiness Scale 
LD lucid dreaming 
LSD lysergic acid diethylamide 
MEG magnetoencephalography 
MR mixed reality 
NCC neural correlates of consciousness 
NMDA N-methyl-d-aspartate 
NPS new/novel psychoactive substances 
NREM non-rapid eye movement 
PET positron emission tomography 
PICI Psychological Immune Competence Inventory 
PIL Purpose in Life [test] 
PSQI Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index  
PSYNDEX psychedelic index [scale] 
QSHE Questionnaire on Subjective Hypnotic Experiences 
RBD REM sleep behavior disorder 
REM rapid eye movement 
SMT Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity 
SoC state(s) of consciousness 
tDCS transcranial direct current stimulation 
TMS transcranial magnetic stimulation 
VR virtual reality 
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1 PREFACE 
The present doctoral thesis is the application of my Information Technology MSc-level skills to 
my PhD-level academic studies. Upon starting my endeavor, I used to refer to this particular 
combination of cognitive neuroscience and IT engineering as "cognitive neuroinformatics". Indeed, 
computerized information processing is crucial in each step of modern scientific research, from the 
acquisition and analysis of digital data with advanced tools and methods, to an easily understandable 
visualization of results for public presentation. The development of IT tools and databases is far from 
the competence field of a scientific researcher; rather, it is the task of a Scientific Research Engineer – a 
title that I fancy to define my 'hybrid' activities with. As all my cognitive neuroscientific engineering 
solutions have eventually contributed to studies and theses of my colleagues (e.g., Noreika et al., 2011; 
Salminen-Vaparanta et al., 2013), the field of my own thesis here is not cognitive neuroscience.  
From 2003 on, I have had the pleasure, honor, and privilege to belong to Prof. Antti 
Revonsuo’s Consciousness Research Group at the Centre for Cognitive Neuroscience in the University 
of Turku, Finland. During these years, our enthusiastic research team has explored and covered several 
subfields within consciousness research: from dreaming, hypnosis, and anesthesia to epilepsy, 
meditation, and visual awareness. Besides theoretical work and psychological methods, such as 
questionnaires, interviews and diaries, we have utilized various technical methods, such as 
electroencephalography (EEG), transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), and transcranial direct current 
stimulation (tDCS). 
In this doctoral thesis, I present some of my studies related to one of the main common 
interests of our research group, namely altered states of consciousness (ASC). Within this broad topic, 
my special areas of interest included the relationship between various ASC, the mechanisms of 
hallucinations, the subjective effects of mind-altering substances, the neural basis of dreaming, and 
the phenomenon of lucid dreaming. Customary to practices in basic scientific research, only some of 
these studies have yielded publications for me and/or my colleagues so far, and many of them are still 
half-done 'works in progress', waiting for further resources or motivation. These yet uncompleted 
studies will be discussed at the end of this thesis as recommendations for further research. 
During the course of my PhD studies with a psychology major, my focus within the discipline 
has gradually shifted from the initial neuropsychological orientation to a more sociopsychological 
direction. This shift can be explained by factors such as group dynamics and research funding, as well 
as by personal influences that guided my interests toward social and societal dimensions, for example 
health research, harm reduction, drug user communities, and drug policy. Since 2010, the emerging 
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phenomenon of New Psychoactive Substances (NPS) has become another core area of my expertise, 
next to psychedelic drugs. In this thesis, I attempt to summarize my relevant findings within my initially 
chosen disciplines and topics, to fit them coherently into a multidisciplinary bio-psycho-socio-spiritual 
framework, and to explain further the complex phenomenon of altered consciousness. 
The reference to virtual reality (VR) in the thesis title requires an additional explanation 
already here in the beginning. Originally, the scope of the current doctoral thesis was ambitiously – 
and admitted; naïvely – set to include VR in a dual form: both as a theoretical metaphor of 
'world-simulation', and as a three-dimensional computer technology (that I had a previous interest in 
and experience with). However, after spending a few years of my thesis work by programming 
thousands of lines of a novel software platform for VR-based data visualization, I slowly realized the 
inadequacy of my resources and gave up pursuing this wholly new line of research. Therefore, the VR 
term will be used throughout this thesis only as a metaphorical notion to explain the theory synthesis 
of 'virtual realism', while VR as a computer technology remains merely a potential future research 
interest with no actualized relevance to the present thesis. 
Concluding this preface, I perhaps owe an explanation about why did it take 14 years to get 
my doctoral thesis done... The reason is definitely not a decreased interest in the topics of 
consciousness and ASC; I still think that these are the most fascinating scientific themes one can ever 
study and explore. Because of this interest, I have been cumulatively involved in an enormous amount 
of ASC-related academic and non-academic activities, many of them being mere 'sidetracks', i.e., 
irrelevant to my doctoral thesis. Since 2003, I have attended 90 conferences and meetings in 22 
countries, published 8 international peer-reviewed articles and 4 book chapters on totally 'off-topics' 
(e.g., religion, sex workers, NPS), taught 2 semesters my own ASC course at a Buddhist University, 
provided drug-related crisis intervention at 57 parties/festivals, trained 200+ international volunteers, 
supervised 11 psychedelics-related under-/graduate student theses, participated in 4 EU projects as a 
drug expert, peer-reviewed 13 manuscripts for scientific journals, founded a Multidisciplinary Society 
for Psychedelic Studies and a Medical Cannabis Association, and so on. Fortunately, I do not regret any 
of this 'wasted' time, as all these ASC-related interactions have significantly defined who I am today. 
During the 14 years of my doctoral studies, I received a total of 74,178 EUR in stipends, which 
corresponds roughly to 4 years of an assistant’s salary in Finland (around 1,500 EUR/month). Hence, 
my doctoral studies have also taught me novel ways to stretch the penny (eurocent) without having to 
take ASC-unrelated day jobs—for which survival skills I am also grateful to the University of Turku. 
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2 INTRODUCTION 
The scientific study of consciousness has emerged as a particularly fascinating subfield that 
aims to explore an 'ultimate mystery': the subjective experience of reality. Even though the topic has 
been long debated by philosophers, recent developments in neuroimaging have provided a particularly 
practical set of novel tools for exploring the mind–brain connection. In the last 20 years, consciousness 
research has emerged as a recognized field in studying the 'science of subjectivity', with its dedicated 
academic journals, professional organizations, and international conferences. Consciousness research 
is importantly related also to cognitive neuroscience, a multidisciplinary academic field (referred to as 
'the biology of the mind') that studies the relationship between the brain and mental processes, such 
as attention, learning, memory, and perception. 
Regardless of its importance and hence available resources, the topic of consciousness may be 
one of the toughest scientific-philosophical issues to investigate. Not only that even the definition of 
the phenomenon has always been (and still is) far from consensus, there are underlying theoretical 
doubts about whether it is possible at all for humans to understand their own consciousness 'from the 
inside'. By digging deeper into the historical roots of the consciousness debate, one may find even 
tougher issues, such as the concept of the soul, the mind–body problem, and serious metaphysical 
considerations. Obviously, the presently emerging science of consciousness is not likely to make any 
ultimate breakthroughs in the near future, but instead it may become a rigorous basic science for a 
systematic investigation of all related phenomena. Research topics may vary from animal minds and 
artificial intelligence to exceptional experiences and quantum theories—and the most relevant for this 
thesis: states of consciousness (SoC). 
Within consciousness research, phenomenologically oriented approaches study both normal 
waking consciousness and also a broad range of phenomena that are commonly labeled as altered 
states of consciousness. Some of the most typical examples of such phenomena are dreaming, 
hypnosis, meditation, hallucinations, and various exceptional trance experiences (e.g., induced by 
chanting, dancing, and drumming). The underlying concept behind these studies is that temporary 
alterations in the mind–brain complex can reveal certain mechanisms that are not particularly 
detectable during the default baseline, or 'normal' mode of operation. Even though measurements of 
neural activity can yield valuable data about what happens in the brain during these special situations, 
phenomenology dominates the picture because of the unusual and often exceptionally rich subjective 
experience that the person lives through. Besides collecting and analyzing these experiences, the 
search for the neural correlates of these phenomena is at the core of ASC research. 
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Today, the still relatively marginal studies of dreaming, hypnosis, and meditation have 
become accepted areas within cognitive neuroscience. While rigorous scientific publications delve into 
the details of brain activity during these special situations, the theoretical background seems to clear 
out only slowly for all these subfields. Albeit nocturnal dreaming is an abundantly frequent 
phenomenon, even basic questions concerning its categorization, function, and content-producing 
mechanisms are still being answered. Similarly, in hypnosis research, there is a vividly ongoing "state–
nonstate debate" on whether hypnotic induction creates a particularly distinguishable mode of 
operation in the mind–brain complex or is explainable with concepts like expectations, cognitive 
strategies, demand characteristics or motivation, with sound reasoning from both sides (actually, more 
than two sides). As meditation studies root in oriental traditions, fundamental linguistic and cultural 
differences make it especially difficult to understand the vast theoretical and practical knowledge 
behind what seems to be merely "sitting with eyes closed". Clearly, there are lots of challenging 
questions to study within the topically and disciplinarily fragmented ASC field. 
Hypnosis and psychedelics are often associated with complex visual experiences that are not 
directly related to the surrounding physical space. Some of these mental occurrences can be termed as 
hallucinations when fulfilling certain criteria defined by current theories. Similar to cases of other ASC 
phenomena, the notion of hallucination is far from being unambiguous, as notably different types of 
experiences are described under one term. Moreover, as many of the hallucinations are related to 
known pathologies like schizophrenia or alcoholism, there is also a debate on whether hallucinations 
are a sign of mental illness or not. Although hallucinations may provide rich phenomenological content 
as well as genuinely unique neuroimaging data, assessing clinical populations may require additional 
special methods, hence making hallucination research notably more difficult to conduct. 
 Altering another person’s consciousness by hypnosis is not at all an easy or automatic task. 
Success depends also on numerous extrapersonal factors in the hypnotic induction procedure, but 
primarily it is the subject’s inherent hypnotic susceptibility that matters. Among numerous 
consciousness-altering techniques, perhaps the most straightforward method is the application of 
psychoactive substances, in particular hallucinogenic drugs. Neuropharmacological pathways are quick, 
effective, and reliable routes to induce notable mental changes, with relatively minimal effects on 
bodily functions. Psychedelic (i.e., "mind-manifesting") drugs are capable of significantly altering 
practically all subsystems of consciousness, thus they qualify as great potential tools for the research of 
the mind. Unfortunately to science, mind-altering substances of this category became societally and 
culturally stigmatized so that human research has been virtually non-existent for the last five decades, 
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until very recently. Because of this de facto taboo status, it is assumedly psychedelic science that has 
the greatest unexplored research potential at the moment within the ASC branches. 
Even though social drug research provides only a thin layer of information about hidden 
populations of underground drug user subcultures, it is an evidently general finding that drug use as a 
phenomenon shows enormous variance. Complexity is not only due to the neuropharmacological 
differences between the vast array of psychoactive substances – several hundreds and still counting – 
but also due to some less investigated psychosocial factors of drug use. It is notable that a significant 
number of drug studies focus on drug-related problems, such as abuse, addiction, injecting drug use, 
and virus-borne epidemics. While these topics are indeed important from a public health point of view, 
they create a strong bias in representing the overall nature of drug use, which is most often 
non-problematic. From this broader scope, the simple research question "What psychosocial factors 
are likely to lead toward drug use?" expands to three other questions: What psychosocial factors are 
likely to (1) protect against all drug use; (2) result in problem drug use; and (3) protect from problem 
drug use? Clearly, the history of hallucinatory ASC is most closely related to the third question, hence 
this thesis explores motivational factors, purposes, and intentions of non-problematic drug use. 
From subjects’ viewpoints, there are striking differences between individual accounts of 
specific ASC. It is still not yet known what brain mechanisms yield the experience of dreaming (or the 
lack of it) during the same sleep stages on different occasions. Similarly, individual differences in 
hypnotic susceptibility are difficult to predict, and the relative proportions of highly susceptible and 
non-susceptible persons are roughly equal in size. In contrast, inducing an ASC with psychoactive drugs 
is always effective due to the direct neuropharmacological manipulation of the brain. However, the 
quality of the induced mind-alteration shows remarkable individual differences in its course and 
experienced content, varying from life-enhancing supreme bliss to traumatic hellish paranoia. 
Explanations for all these differences are likely to require a multidisciplinary approach, as the involved 
variables are assumed to be both neurocognitive and psychosocial. 
During various ASC, phenomenally experienced cognitive and perceptual changes are often 
accepted as 'real', without self-reflections on the state alteration itself. By not being compared, the 
transient subjective reality gets unbound from previous states of subjective reality, which enables 
potentially significant changes in space-time and object perception, cognitive-emotional processing, 
thought associations, abstract thinking, etc. Using the world-simulation metaphor, this process can be 
conceptualized as if the mind–brain complex was running its virtual reality generator in a changed 
mode of operation. To continue with this technically based analogue: operational differences can be 
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thought of as the various 'settings' or 'configurations' of consciousness subsystems in the VR simulator. 
The differences in VR configuration can be systematically examined between (1) different ASC in the 
same individual, (2) different individuals in the same ASC, and (3) the baseline SoC and an ASC in the 
same individual. 
The metaphoric use of VR in the context of ASC leads to a novel approach to consciousness 
that could be called 'virtual realism'. Despite holding a different view on consciousness, virtual realism 
does not conflict with physicalist, biological realist, nor dualist theories. It claims neither an inner 
representation of an external physical reality, nor an outward projection of an internally generated 
mental reality as the primary explanation on conscious experience. Virtual realism holds that 
phenomenally experienced subjective reality is what consciousness primarily 'does' and is about: a 
process that systematically organizes the confluence of complex information into an individual 
experience of existence. In this sense, virtual realism acknowledges (but does not limit itself to) the 
physical constrains of its operating environment. Still, it also leaves possibilities open for yet unknown 
metaphysical variables that may affect the world-simulator mechanism by the mind–brain complex. 
The present doctoral thesis explores the topic of ASC by using the VR metaphor as its 
conceptual basis. In particular, the thesis ponders conceptual definition problems of ASC, charts 
various phenomena, compares similarities and differences, and thus investigates the possible 
configurations of VR mechanisms on cognitive, psychological, social, and spiritual levels. Under the 
unifying theme of induced altered states, the thesis includes a theoretical ASC study, an experimental 
hypnosis study, a psychedelic drug survey study, and a commentary article on the functions of 
hallucinatory drug use. 
The diversity of topics touched and methods applied within the thesis may make the 
impression of an exploratory "bits-and-pieces" approach to ASC. Given the current state of research in 
this unexplored area, this impression holds admittedly true: ASC is indeed a fragmented field within 
the similarly fragmented field of consciousness research. Nevertheless, with the basic conceptual and 
experimental work presented here, I wish to insert my own fragment of contribution into the 
'puzzle-work' of my chosen field of interest. Hopefully, on one day, orchestrated scientific and 
philosophical efforts will come up with novel ideas and methods for unifying several lines of studies on 
all these fascinating aspects of the conscious experience. 
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3 BACKGROUND 
3.1 Consciousness 
3.1.1 The science of consciousness: A brief history 
For a discussion starter about consciousness, it seems appropriate to echo the frequent 
statement: The problem of consciousness is one of the last great undiscovered mysteries of science. 
The emerging importance of the topic is evident: In 2005, one of the world’s top scientific journals, 
Science magazine put the question "What Is the Biological Basis of Consciousness?" on its Top 25 Big 
Questions list (Kennedy & Norman, 2005; Miller, 2005). However, the question of consciousness is 
indeed not a new one. The issue relates to such perpetual and fundamental questions as the concept 
of the soul, the mind–body problem, and other metaphysical considerations concerning the nature of 
reality—all of these have been subjects of philosophical enquiry for centuries. 
Debates on 'thinking' and 'mental' issues had surged from the Age of Enlightenment on, 
especially as modern Western philosophy took shape and became influenced by the dualist ideas of its 
early pioneer René Descartes (1596-1650). Even though studies on the anatomy and physiology of the 
human body had been increasingly carried out by the emerging natural sciences, the mental domain – 
along with its putative connections to the physical domain – remained predominantly the territory of 
philosophers, such as Locke (1632-1704), Leibniz (1646-1716), Hume (1711-1776), and Kant 
(1724-1804). 
In the end of the 19th century, consciousness as a study topic took a distinguished place in the 
wake of the then-novel discipline of psychology and related philosophical thought. One of the 
foremost pioneers of psychology, the prominent thinker William James (1842-1910) referred to 
consciousness as an ever-flowing stream of thought (James, 1892). Along with his contemporaries 
Wilhelm Wundt and Edward B. Titchener, James studied consciousness by introspection—a method 
that consequently became gradually backgrounded under the influence of behaviorism from the early 
20th century on. For the following decades, behaviorists had bracketed consciousness by reducing the 
focus of investigation to publicly observable bodily behavior. The behaviorist paradigm practically 
dominated psychology until the 1960s, when cognitive science took a different approach by studying 
internal information processing mechanisms, such as memory, perception and language 
comprehension. It is also to be noted that in the following decades, remarkable interdisciplinary 
convergences with brain sciences occurred in philosophy, phenomenology, and psychology, as well as 
in the aforementioned cognitive sciences. 
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"Classical" consciousness-related research has been carried out by detailed analysis of 
neurological cases – e.g., split-brain studies, blindsight – throughout the 20th century. Modern 
neuroscientific studies of consciousness began to take shape in the 1990s, the declared "decade of the 
brain". The new approach, embedded within the emerging interdisciplinary field of cognitive 
neuroscience, was enabled by the rapid development of brain imaging methods, such as functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), magnetoencephalography (MEG), and positron emission 
tomography (PET). Consciousness studies have become more and more a part of scientific research, 
instead of the sole domain of classical 'armchair philosophy'. At the same time, new conceptual 
directions such as neurophilosophy and neurophenomenology began to contribute to the field of 
consciousness research, making it a guided multidisciplinary effort instead of a merely exploratory one. 
3.1.2 Contemporary consciousness science 
As of the early 21st century, needs for scientific research programs on consciousness have 
been specified, and cognitive neuroscience was found as the most fruitful approach despite some of its 
obstacles (Revonsuo, 2000a). The mind–body (or mind–brain) issue is certainly not as straightforward 
as Descartes imagined by asserting that the pineal gland is the principal "seat of the soul". To date, 
neurophysiological research has not been able to find support for the concept that the pineal gland or 
any similar single brain 'center' could sufficiently provide complex mental functions, such as 
consciousness (Damasio, 2000). Rather, it seems that complex operations of cortical and subcortical 
structures are relevant and necessary for consciousness to be present. Albeit some candidate 
neurophysiological markers of consciousness have proved illusory, there is also promising ongoing 
research on, e.g., a temporo-parietal-occipital 'hot zone' of the posterior cerebral cortex where the 
best current anatomical candidates for the neural correlates of consciousness are located (Boly et al., 
2017; Koch, Massimini, Boly, & Tononi, 2016).  
Consciousness-involved brain networks can be revealed by a systematic charting of the neural 
correlates of the phenomenal experience. However, we also need to find out about the 'explanatory 
correlates' of consciousness, i.e., how phenomenal experiences can exist in the first place (Seth, 2009). 
The integration process of distinct sensory input into a single seamless conscious content – the binding 
problem – is also of scientific interest. Furthermore, the tasks of measuring contents and states of 
consciousness are also challenging, especially as both notions are still subjects of ongoing conceptual 
debates. From a clinical aspect, various psychiatric disorders with a relevance to consciousness are also 
of interest for studies. Such a characteristic syndrome is depersonalization disorder (DPD), in which the 
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subjective feeling becomes 'unreal' for the patient due to a significant detachment of several aspects 
of the self and the environment (Sierra & David, 2011). 
The scope of consciousness studies is not at all limited to humans only, but it may also extend 
to animal consciousness and machine consciousness. The phenomenal experience in its complexity is 
clearly beyond the fundamental state of being merely sentient (which is attributed to animals), or of 
being intelligent (an achievable property of computational systems). Further research on primates, 
other mammals, and even some birds are in progress; simultaneously, contemporary computational 
and robotic models of consciousness are being built in an attempt to simulate – and perhaps later to 
instantiate – conscious properties (Seth, 2010). Contemporary consciousness science is thus an 
increasingly coordinated multidisciplinary effort that currently includes a wide range of conceptual, 
philosophical, neural, cognitive, computational, quantum physical etc. approaches (to be detailed in 
the following subchapters). Indeed, the complexity of the consciousness issue requires a convergence 
of manifold approaches; due to a notably increasing amount of efforts, optimism for making 
substantial advances in consciousness science is prevailing (Seth, 2010). 
3.1.3 Conceptual clarifications 
 So what is consciousness about, and what does it mean to be conscious? As expectable, there 
are many possible answers to these questions, depending on the various definitions and notions of 
consciousness. In lay language, the term 'conscious' is often associated with an awake and alert state, 
as opposed to being in an 'unconscious' state during anesthesia or in coma. However, necessity for 
these two state criteria can be conceptually questioned, for example, by bringing up the case of 
dreaming—a state with substantial ongoing mental experience, in the lack of wakefulness and 
alertness. In philosophical debates, primary, phenomenal, or core consciousness refers to the 
subjective experience of being 'here and now', or having the feeling of an 'inner presence' (Revonsuo, 
2006). Another common notion of the 'C-word' refers to awareness, i.e., having an experience, having 
phenomenal consciousness. Consciousness may be also transitively directed at the environment, some 
object, or the experience itself, to reflect upon some content. This latter type of consciousness is often 
defined as secondary, reflective, access, or extended consciousness (Block, 1995; Revonsuo, 2006). 
When referring to information processing in terms of being able to access specific pieces of content, 
the proper dipole terms of conscious are either nonconscious or unconscious; while nonconscious 
material means the total lack of subjective experience and therefore can never become conscious, 
unconscious material, in principle, can.  
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 Apart from in vitro basic neuroscientific research, but in addition to in silico computational 
modeling, a large part of consciousness research happens in vivo by using human subjects who are able 
to report their phenomenal, subjective experiences. Such reporting may be asked retrospectively, or in 
'real-time' during experiments where subjects may optionally perform cognitive tasks, and/or could be 
measured by neurophysiological instruments. From a phenomenological viewpoint, consciousness is 
crucially related to the subjective character of the experience. As Nagel (1974, p. 436) originally put it: 
"[...] fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something that it is 
to be that organism—something it is like for the organism". Thus, it is suggested that in order to give a 
proper explanation for the subjective conscious experience, biological research programs should 
reconceptualize consciousness as the phenomenal level of organization in the brain (Revonsuo, 2000a). 
As the conceptual background for this thesis, I used Revonsuo’s biological realism as a basic approach 
to the scientific study of consciousness; however, I tend to be open also for (an information technology 
based type of) pragmatism, in order to develop my own, fully compatible position of virtual realism. 
3.1.4 Philosophical explanations 
The problem of consciousness is a – or perhaps: the – core issue in contemporary debates 
within the philosophy of mind. Albeit it would be virtually impossible to provide a thorough, or even a 
brief overview here, some relevant approaches must be introduced in order to caption the wider 
conceptual background of consciousness studies, in particular, the viewpoint of biological realism. It is 
important to keep in mind that no single widely accepted theory of consciousness exists, but the field 
is characterized by tens of competing and occasionally starkly contradicting approaches. While radical 
eliminativist approaches deny the whole existence of consciousness, and others think that at least its 
qualitative properties are merely illusory epiphenomena, most theories attempt to guide philosophical 
and empirical endeavors into the topic of consciousness—with the exception of strong emergent 
materialists who claim that humans will never be capable of solving this mystery (for more detailed 
overviews, see e.g., Noreika, 2014; Van Gulick, 2017). 
It is to be noted that the presence of a phenomenal, subjective, qualitatively felt experience is 
held to be centrally important for consciousness. Metaphysical theories propose to explain the 
ontological status of consciousness in relation with the physical world (including the brain) by using 
known arguments from the classical mind–body problem in philosophy. The predominant distinction is 
between dualist theories claiming the ontological independence and irreducibility of the mind and the 
physical world, as opposed to monist theories arguing for one substance only—in the case of 
physicalism: matter. Materialist theories may take a reductionist stance by assuming identity between 
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mental and physical processes and states, or – as in the case of biological naturalism – may 
conceptualize consciousness as an emergent, qualitative, subjective, high-level brain function that has 
causal powers, and is ontologically irreducible (Searle, 1992, p. 1; Searle, 2007). Biological realism, the 
background for this thesis, is also a weak emergent materialist approach very close to biological 
naturalism (Revonsuo, 2010, p.28). 
Interestingly, certain philosophical theories may accept a possible co-existence of the dualist–
monist opposite assumptions, like the strong and weak versions of ontological pluralism do (Turner, 
2010). Moreover, some further theories do not have metaphysical commitments at all; for instance, 
functionalism focuses only on input, processing, and output—regardless of the substrate implementing 
these functions. In a similarly neutral way, pragmatist approaches promote only an assumedly most 
promising empirical methodology (e.g., neurobiology) as a currently best instrument to go, 
nevertheless they remain open to be replaced after sufficient exploration with that tool (Noreika, 
2014; Van Gulick, 2017). 
A notable philosophical endeavor is the Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (SMT) by Metzinger 
(2003), who utilizes a constraint-satisfaction approach to explain phenomenal experience. The SMT 
describes minimal consciousness as the presence of a world: a transparently experienced, coherent, 
global model of reality within a virtual window of presence. The central ontological claim of the SMT is 
that "no such things as selves exist in the world" (Metzinger, 2005, p. 3); the notion of a self is 
eliminated as a theoretical entity, and handled as a very special kind of representational, dynamic 
content of a phenomenal self-model. This theory has special relevance as it ponders the reality of 
subjective experience as a presented world-model: SMT is a significant conceptual contribution to the 
development of the idea of virtual realism that will be described later in this thesis. 
 There are also ongoing philosophical debates about the possible functions of consciousness, 
the self (or ego), and the problem of free will; however, these topics are not addressed in this thesis. It 
must be kept in mind that philosophy is just one, formalized disciplinary approach that seeks answers 
to ultimate human questions. Besides intellectual and academic approaches, there is a vast quantity of 
informal beliefs, anecdotes, speculations, and myths about the nature of man, reality, soul, and world. 
Even though these topics are also not being discussed in this thesis, cultural aspects are nevertheless 
related to a broader understanding of the long-lasting quest for consciousness; see e.g., an overview of 
the soul concept in human cultures by Frecska, Móró, and Wesselman (2011). 
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3.1.5 Neural level research methods 
The search for the biological basis of consciousness – or more precisely, for its neural 
correlates – is one of the core focuses within empirical consciousness research. A considerable line of 
neurobiological studies is focusing on visual consciousness (Crick & Koch, 1990; Crick & Koch, 2003; 
Koch, et al., 2016), more precisely on mechanisms that transiently bind together information from 
neurons related to the features of a processed visual object. It is suggested that coherent synchronous 
gamma band oscillations (around 40 Hz) activate short-term working memory, thus perform the 
binding function of consciousness. The relevance of higher-order consciousness to synchronous 
gamma activity has been pointed out also by inducing self-reflective awareness in dreams (that hence 
became lucid dreams) through frontal low current stimulation of gamma activity with tDCS (Voss et al., 
2014). Other visual system based theories propose that there is no final integrator station in the brain, 
thus consciousness should not be thought of as a unity, but instead binding occurs between 
spatiotemporally distributed micro-consciousnesses (Zeki, 2003). Another neural approach is the 
Dynamic Core Hypothesis (Tononi & Edelman, 1998), which states that conscious experience occurs 
only if a distributed complex functional cluster of neuronal groups achieves high integration in 
hundreds of milliseconds through reentrant interactions in the thalamocortical system. (This 
hypothesis has been developed further into the Information Integration Theory, see below in detail.) 
The contrasting of conscious and unconscious states has been used in both anesthesia-related 
and dreaming-related consciousness research that examined certain neurophysiological and 
neuropharmacological processes. According to a prominent receptor-level neural theory, it is the 
NMDA (N-methyl-d-aspartate) synapse that implements binding mechanisms for large-scale neuronal 
cell assemblies. The spatiotemporal activity pattern of such assemblies produces a specific class of 
computational processes, which instantiate those higher-order self-reflexive mental representations 
that are necessary and sufficient for the occurrence of phenomenal states. An (almost) complete 
inhibition of the NMDA-dependent processes, like during anesthesia with ketamine, leads to a loss of 
consciousness, while their partial inhibition leads to an ASC (Flohr, 2006). A recent PET study that 
searched for the minimal neural correlates of consciousness by investigating the re-emergence of 
consciousness after anesthetic-induced unconsciousness has found that a core network involving 
subcortical and limbic regions becomes functionally coupled with parts of frontal and inferior parietal 
cortices (Långsjö et al., 2012). Dissociation between the presence of subjective experiences and 
observed responsiveness during anesthesia was also shown in our EEG study (Noreika, et al., 2011).  
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The differences between conscious and nonconscious modes of information processing are at 
another focus of neurocognitively oriented research. Contrastive analysis studies measure the 
presence or absence of conscious perception of a particular content, and compare the differences in 
neural activity during the experimental conditions (Aru, Bachmann, Singer, & Melloni, 2012). Recent 
dream studies have found significant correlations in TMS-evoked EEG responses between subjects who 
reported having dreamt and others who did not recall conscious experiences when woken up from 
non-rapid eye movement (NREM) sleep (Nieminen et al., 2016). Moreover, researchers have been able 
to predict whether a subject will report the presence or absence of their NREM sleep dream 
experiences by monitoring low-frequency activity in posterior cortical areas (Siclari et al., 2017). 
Besides 'on/off' type differences, other approaches study the gradual alteration in consciousness on a 
presence–absence continuum, e.g., during epileptic seizures (Yu & Blumenfeld, 2009). Brain networks 
underlying phenomenal consciousness can be also explored by charting non-responsive states, such as 
during the fully conscious locked-in syndrome and the nonconscious unresponsive wakefulness 
syndrome (UWS, formerly called vegetative state), or the minimally conscious state, where a reduced 
set of consciousness and responsiveness is still maintained (Giacino, Fins, Laureys, & Schiff, 2014; 
Laureys, Owen, & Schiff, 2004). 
3.1.6 Phenomenological and other approaches 
Due to the subjective nature of the lived experience, the phenomenology of consciousness 
has become an increasingly essential part of recent empirical studies. As already envisioned by early 
pioneers such as James, novel directions within the science of consciousness are expected to 
emphasize the fusion of phenomenology, embodiment, and cognitive neuroscience (Taylor, 2010). In 
order to tackle the hard problem of subjectivity, the need for matching third-person objective 
measurements with "the view from within" – i.e., first-person reported accounts – has therefore 
created the field of neurophenomenology (Varela & Shear, 1999a; Varela & Shear, 1999b). Recently, 
several interview techniques to obtain systematic and detailed subjective reports have been also put 
forward as "second-person methods" (Olivares, Vargas, Fuentes, Martínez-Pernía, & Canales-Johnson, 
2015). The descriptive phenomenological approach, stemming originally from Husserlian philosophy, 
has been robustly incorporated into psychology as a qualitative method (Giorgi, 1997). Another 
empirical approach is to quantify the subjective experience with self-report questionnaires, such as the 
Phenomenology of Consciousness Inventory (PCI) by Pekala (1991; Pekala, Steinberg, & Kumar, 1986). 
The phenomenological significance of ASC, in particular of psychedelic experiences, has been 
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repeatedly pointed out lately by multidisciplinary approaches from philosophy, psychology, and the 
neurosciences (Horváth, Szummer, & Szabó, 2017; Szabó, Horváth, & Szummer, 2014). 
A large number of non-philosophical, non-neural approaches are also dealing with 
consciousness from cognitive, informational, and quantum physical points of view, out of which only a 
few are selected to be mentioned here very briefly. Evidence from minimally contrastive pairs of 
similar events, i.e., differences between conscious and nonconscious modes of information processing 
of a particular content, have been captured in a single coherent cognitive framework, the Global 
Workspace Theory (GWT) by Baars (1988, 1997). This cognitively oriented theory illustrates working 
memory with a theater metaphor, where attention acts as a selective spotlight that directs focal 
consciousness on conscious events on the stage. Based on the GWT, neural level explanations has been 
also put forth later, notably the Global Neuronal Workspace model by Dehaene and Changeux (1998) 
that describes the interaction between a distributed and interconnected global workspace neurons 
and specialized neural processing modules (for a review, see e.g., Dehaene & Changeux, 2011).  
A highly influential recent approach to the problem of subjectivity is the Information 
Integration Theory (IIT), stating that consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate 
information (Oizumi, Albantakis, & Tononi, 2014; Tononi, 2004). The theory quantifies a system’s 
consciousness by assigning a Φ value for a subset of elements (called a complex) for the amount of 
information that can be integrated. Conscious experience may therefore be specified by the variables 
of informational interactions between elements within a complex. Since its debut, the IIT has been 
developed by Tononi et al. into its current 3.0 version (Oizumi, et al., 2014), and is a subject to vivid 
ongoing theoretical contributions (e.g., Jonkisz, 2015) and practical applications (Casali et al., 2013). 
A proposed quantum physics model for consciousness (Hameroff & Penrose, 1996, 2014) puts 
consciousness-related information processing at the subcellular level of cytoskeletal microtubules 
within each neuron. However, no experimental confirmations have been directly supporting this or 
other quantum theories of consciousness (e.g., Beck & Eccles, 1992), for which reason they are 
considered to be far too speculative, hence difficult to implement into any current experimental 
research. Nevertheless, highly interesting fundamental hypotheses are being put forward in this area, 
such as the tentative 'neuro-ontological' interpretation based on a biophysical approach by Frecska et 
al. (2011); this concept emphasizes the important role of ASC in enabling non-local subneuronal 
'direct-intuitive' information processing. 
Finally, it is to be emphasized here that the field of consciousness studies is still – and 
probably will always be – far from united. Some approaches may be incompatible with other 
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approaches, may criticize each other, or may even dismiss the whole 'problem' of consciousness. For 
instance, even one of the most influential consciousness-related philosophical papers – with around 
2500 citations –, where David Chalmers (1995, p. 202) defined that "[t]he really hard problem of 
consciousness is the problem of experience" (i.e., the subjective aspect), has been criticized for being 
"set up against a backdrop of questionable metaphysical, epistemological and phenomenological 
assumptions" (Ratcliffe, 2007, p. 483). These debates are nevertheless welcome, as they may and 
hopefully will advance the field of consciousness studies into novel conceptual directions. 
3.2 Altered states of consciousness 
In the mind–brain complex, there exists a plethora of unusual, special, 'altered' modes of 
operation, parted from the usual, everyday, 'baseline' state of consciousness only "by the filmiest of 
screens" (James, 1902, p. 305). These marked neurocognitive alterations of consciousness are both 
philosophically and scientifically fascinating, as they demonstrate great variability within the potential 
spectrum of altered states of consciousness (ASC). It has been already stated by one of the field’s early 
pioneers that in order to develop a comprehensive psychology, the data from ASC cannot be ignored 
(Tart, 1975/2001). Likewise, contemporary theories of consciousness should also be able to 
conceptually explain and integrate these special states. 
While some ASC may occur naturally or spontaneously, and some are of pathologic origin, 
many others can be deliberately induced by "various physiological, psychological, or pharmacological 
maneuvers or agents" (Ludwig, 1966, p. 225). Listings of "relatively common and/or intensively studied" 
ASC usually include phenomena such as hypnagogic (drowsy pre-sleep) state, dreaming sleep, 
hypnosis, meditative states, and mystical or transcendental experiences. Moreover, ASC lists include 
states induced by sensory deprivation, psychoactive drugs (such as alcohol, cannabis, lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD), etc.), starvation and diet, sexual activity (ending in orgasm), respiratory maneuvers 
(e.g., hyperventilation), repetitive rhythm (e.g., trance states achieved by drumming, dancing, and 
chanting), and relaxation techniques; ASC may also occur during certain psychotic disorders (Farthing, 
1992; Tart, 1975/2001; Vaitl et al., 2013). Subjective experience may be absent temporarily during 
dreamless sleep, or permanently in a vegetative state or coma; these situations are not ASC but states 
of non-consciousness. 
Conceptual issues regarding ASC, such as its definitions, are still not consensually 
agreed-upon. Perhaps the most classical definition of ASC was coined by Tart (1975/2001, p. 208) as: 
"A qualitative alteration in the overall pattern of mental functioning, such that the experiencer feels his 
consciousness is radically different from the way it functions ordinarily". Farthing (1992) gives the 
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following definition in his textbook: "An altered state of consciousness is a temporary change in the 
overall pattern of subjective experience, such that the individual believes that his/her mental 
functioning is distinctly different from certain general norms for his/her normal waking state of 
consciousness". 
From these definitions of what an ASC is, three commonalities can be pointed out 
immediately. First, there is a self-evaluation criterion, i.e., the definitions are based on how the subject 
feels or believes about his/her state of consciousness (which, of course, may not be consensual, as we 
can have ASC without realizing we are in an ASC, such as during regular, non-lucid dreaming). Second, 
self-detected alterations occur in mental functioning, i.e., the definitions refer to the psychological 
domain as the source of data. Third, changes in mental functioning refer to an (unspecified) ordinary or 
'normal' baseline state of the subject (as assessed by the subject himself/herself), i.e., there is a 
comparison involved. By looking at the above lists of selected ASC and at the above attempts to define 
them, it is hard to decide if the ASC were involved in a listing on the basis of a pre-assembled ASC 
definition, or if the definitions were made on the basis of a pre-compiled ASC listing. To my 
understanding, this conceptual 'selection–definition ordering problem" has never before been dealt 
with; its possible solution is offered in my Study I (Móró, 2010). 
Besides these above (phenomenological) factors of ASC experiences, it is useful to specify 
what features are being altered also by concepts of cognitive and phenomenological psychology; four 
influential listings are reviewed here. Tart (1975/2001) mentions 10 subsystems: Exteroception, 
interoception, input-processing, memory, sense of identity, emotions, evaluation and decision-making, 
subconscious, motor output, and space/time sense. Pekala (1991; 1986) lists 12 major (and 14 minor) 
dimensions in his PCI as follows: altered experience, arousal (decreased relaxation), altered state of 
awareness, attention, internal dialogue, imagery, memory, negative affect, positive affect, rationality, 
self-awareness, and volitional control. Farthing (1992) has a 14-item list about dimensions of conscious 
experience: Attention, perception, imagery and fantasy, inner speech, memory, higher-level thought 
processes, meaning or significance of experience, time experience, emotional feeling and expression, 
arousal, self-control, suggestibility, body image, and sense of personal identity. Similarly, Hobson 
(2007) enumerates 9 mental elements (or capacities of mind, or components of consciousness): 
Perception, attention, memory, orientation, thought, narrative, instinct, intention, and volition. 
Strikingly, the lists are far from overlapping: 'memory' is the only common item mentioned on all four 
of them, despite all enlisted terms are important notions in various disciplines studying the mind. The 
lack of unambiguously separable and easily definable mental subsystems reflects perhaps a similar 
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difficulty in assigning straightforward single roles for cortical areas on the neurocognitive side of 
consciousness research. 
Animal observations revealed that deliberate state-altering seems to play an important role, 
as if there exists a natural force that motivates the pursuit of intoxication; a "fourth drive" following 
hunger, thirst, and sex (Siegel, 2005). Moreover, ASC studies from archeological and evolutional 
perspectives have also examined the fascinating questions: Why induced ASC are so inherently part of 
the human experience in every major culture that we know about? Could there be any potentially 
great benefits of mind-altering, or is it just an epiphenomenal "intoxication side-effect" (Froese, 2015)? 
The relationship between various (pairs of) ASC is also of continuous research interest. For 
instance, similarities and differences between hypnosis and meditation have been reflected upon with 
an increasing interest by several researchers (e.g., Benedittis, 2015; Holroyd, 2003). Another line of 
study examined the presence and lack of insight during lucid dreams and psychosis, respectively 
(Dresler et al., 2015). It has been also suggested that sleep studies may foster the scientific 
understanding of hypnosis (Kahn & Hobson, 2003). 
In order to shed light on the phenomenon of ASC from a human viewpoint, it is essential to 
capture the intentions behind state-altering efforts by better understanding the functions of 
psychoactive drug use as the perhaps most widespread and general ASC-inducing method. Such a 
newly proposed concept is drug instrumentalization by Müller and Schumann (2011), introducing the 
idea that humans are deliberately changing their mental states by drugs, "in order to facilitate other, 
non-drug-related behaviors". This framework will be further discussed below in Study IV. 
3.2.1 Measuring induced ASC with questionnaires 
Contemporary research directions on various ASC explore both the contents of these states as 
well as their underlying mechanisms. Systematic studies have been done on charting and measuring 
the phenomenological dimensions of ASC (Studerus, Gamma, & Vollenweider, 2010), to explain their 
psychobiology (Vaitl, et al., 2013) and functional neuroanatomy (Dietrich, 2003; Hobson, 2002; 
Vollenweider & Geyer, 2001), to clarify their role in religion and spirituality (Bartocci, 2004), and to 
investigate their applicability in psychotherapy (Buckley & Galanter, 1979; Field, 1992). Next, the most 
important questionnaire studies relevant to the current thesis, in particular because of the 
measurement of psychoactive substance related ASC, will be briefly introduced. 
The pioneering ASC-measuring scale – besides PCI – was the originally German language APZ 
(Aussergewöhnliche Psychische Zustände) questionnaire by Dittrich et al. (1985). The APZ was followed 
by its psychometrically improved version (OAV), and an extended version including visual and auditory 
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hallucinations (5D-ASC). These questionnaires have been psychometrically tested and translated to 
several other languages. The acronym OAV comes from the initial letters of the original German names 
of its three primary dimensions: 'oceanic boundlessness', 'dread of ego dissolution', and 'visionary 
restructuralization'. Recently, the OAV has been analyzed and modeled by multiple methods, and 11 
new lower order scales were constructed out of its original three primary and one secondary 
dimensions, in order to better assess drug induced ASC. These 11 new factors of ASC are: Experience of 
unity, Spiritual experience, Blissful state, Insightfulness, Disembodiment, Impaired control and 
cognition, Anxiety, Complex imagery, Elementary imagery, Audio-visual synesthesiae, and Changed 
meaning of percepts (Studerus, et al., 2010); for a recent review see Preller and Vollenweider (2016).  
Another ASC-measuring scale, the HRS (Hallucinogen Rating Scale), was developed by 
Strassman and his colleagues (Strassman, Qualls, Uhlenhuth, & Kellner, 1994) during human 
experiments with N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT) administration, later validated with, e.g., ayahuasca 
study data (Riba, Rodriguez-Fornells, Strassman, & Barbanoj, 2001). Psychedelics-related ASC studies 
also utilize the Challenging Experience Questionnaire (Barrett, Bradstreet, Leoutsakos, Johnson, & 
Griffiths, 2016), the Mystical Experience Questionnaire (MacLean, Leoutsakos, Johnson, & Griffiths, 
2012), and the Ego-Dissolution Inventory (Nour, Evans, Nutt, & Carhart-Harris, 2016). 
3.2.2 Hallucinations in ASC 
In certain subsets of ASC, the core sensory experience may radically alter and result in 
experiences of various hallucinations. Perception without a corresponding external stimulus is 
generally considered a sign of strong mental alteration, hence the presence of hallucinations is taken 
as a definitive indicator of an ASC. Hallucinations may occur in all – visual, auditory, olfactory, 
gustatory, or tactile – sensory modalities (Aleman & Larøi, 2008). Remarkably many types of 
hallucinatory phenomena are natural and sleep-related (with an ongoing conceptual debate whether 
dreaming itself counts as a hallucination or not), but can also occur during pathological medical 
conditions, such as in schizophrenia or alcohol withdrawal. Hallucinations can be deliberately induced 
by hypnotic suggestions (Orne, 1959), sleep deprivation (West, Janszen, Lester, & Cornelisoon, 1962), 
and photic stimulation (ffytche, 2008), as well as by psychedelic substances (Nichols, 2004), deliriant 
plants (Díaz, 1977), and dissociative drugs (Rolland et al., 2014). 
The manifold definitions of hallucination are commonly referring to the person’s subjective 
experience (i.e., the phenomenal level), the involvement of the sensory domain, a distinction between 
external and internal sources of information, and to the 'trueness' of hallucinations. However, in terms 
of information sources, 'external' and 'internal' do not seem to be independent from or alternative to 
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each other, but rather appear as consecutive stages in the information processing chain. Hence, it is 
suggested that the definitions of hallucination should look at the modulation of information instead of 
merely looking at the source of information (Móró, 2010). 
Metacognitive processes, such as self-reflection, insight, and 'reality testing' may make a 
categorical difference between knowingly perceived 'pseudohallucinations' from genuinely believed 
'true' hallucinations, depending on whether the subject knows if he/she is hallucinating or not 
(Rolland, et al., 2014). It is to be noted that because of this 'impairment', many definitions and 
descriptions of hallucination are expressed by using negative value-judging terminology, e.g., 
'abnormal', 'misrepresented', or 'erroneous'. This may even lead to the social dismissal of the whole 
hallucinatory phenomena (Shanon, 2003). Nevertheless, hallucinations offer a fascinating terrain with 
rich subjective contents that are being explored also by phenomenologically oriented cognitive 
neuroscience studies of dreaming and hypnosis. 
Besides its clinical and scientific importance, the phenomenon of hallucinations has strong 
connections also with philosophical and theoretical issues (Macpherson & Platchias, 2013). In 
particular, the philosophy of perception is exploring existential and ontological questions of 'reality' 
(and 'unreality') that are highly relevant also for the philosophy of mind and hence also for 
consciousness studies. These relevancies will be described in connection with the 'virtual reality' 
concept elaborated later in this thesis. 
3.3 Dreaming 
Albeit none of the articles in this doctoral thesis are directly related to dreaming, brief 
remarks on the topic are nevertheless included here because of multiple reasons. Firstly, the 
phenomenon of dreaming has high relevance to the world-simulation concept and metaphor, a core 
topic in developing the virtual realism stance later in this dissertation. Secondly, a particular 
sleep-related phenomenon detailed in Study II, namely sleepiness, is somewhat related to the (also 
sleep-related) phenomenon of dreaming. Thirdly, as dreaming has interesting connections with 
hypnosis (being another topic of Study II), a brief introduction of the wider context is also justified 
here, as follows. 
Dreaming is a major ASC that is relatively well-known and studied-upon in comparison with 
other altered states. The phenomenon of dreaming has always fascinated mankind – both practically 
and metaphysically – as it seems to open a richly experienceable gateway to 'alternative realities' or 
'other dimensions'. Mechanisms, contents, and the possible functions of dreaming have been explored 
by experiments in psychology and neuroscience, thus the topic conveniently belongs to the (relatively 
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new) field of cognitive neuroscience (Nir & Tononi, 2010). Albeit studies of dreaming are occasionally 
related to the sleeping process and its clinically relevant disturbances (e.g., Valli et al., 2012), it is also 
of great scientific interest to find out about the neural correlates of dreaming by studying dreaming vs. 
dreamless sleep (e.g., Noreika, Valli, Lahtela, & Revonsuo, 2009)—keeping in mind that various types 
of sleep experience may occur in different stages of sleep, including the NREM stage (Windt, Nielsen, & 
Thompson, 2016). Within consciousness studies, the phenomenon of dreaming is crucially important 
because of being a naturally occurring, abundantly available ASC that can be explored by collecting 
subjective experience reports. 
Using a metaphor from a then-novel computer technology area, Revonsuo (1995) put forward 
the idea that "dreaming is an organized simulation of the perceptual world; a virtual reality". In his 
influential Threat Simulation Theory, Revonsuo (2000b) advanced his concept further by suggesting 
that as an internal phenomenal 'world-simulation', dreaming may serve as a model system for 
consciousness. Defined as an 'immersive spatiotemporal hallucination' (Windt, 2010), dreaming indeed 
creates a realistic environment that is usually being perceived from a first-person perspective, and is 
only minimally coupled with external sensory input. Due to conceptual concerns and practical 
problems with the adequacy and feasibility of the dream model, alternative study approaches, e.g., the 
contrastive analysis of dreaming with other states, have been also suggested (Windt & Noreika, 2011). 
An unusual form of dreaming, namely lucid dreaming (LD) occurs when a sleeping person is 
able to gain 'meta-awareness' on his/her momentary SoC, and consequently to understand that he/she 
is in a state of dreaming (Voss, Holzmann, Tuin, & Hobson, 2009). The existence of LD is an important 
piece of evidence in showing that the dream state may involve also metacognitive processes (Kahan & 
LaBerge, 1994) due to a "reactivation of areas which are normally deactivated during REM sleep" 
(Dresler et al., 2012, p. 1017). It has been recommended that the topic of LD should move from its 
marginal place to a "center stage in the emerging science of consciousness" (Hobson, 2009, p. 43), and 
that experimental consciousness research on LD should utilize various electrophysiological, brain 
imaging, and cortical stimulation methods in order to find out about the involved brain regions 
(Noreika, Windt, Lenggenhager, & Karim, 2010), as shown in numerous recent LD experiments (e.g., 
Dresler, et al., 2012; Dresler, et al., 2015; Voss, et al., 2014). Other aspects of sleep- and dream-related 
phenomena, such as hypnagogic experiences related to drowsiness, have been also studied recently by 
ASC researchers (e.g., Noreika et al., 2015). 
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3.4 Hypnosis 
Hypnosis is a technique that uses attention-focusing verbal suggestions to induce subjective 
and behavioral changes in another person. The phenomenon has both consciousness-related 
theoretical and widely applied practical contributions, the latter in the fields of psychotherapy and 
anesthesiology (for a thorough overview, see e.g., Terhune, Cleeremans, Raz, & Lynn, in press). 
Debates about whether hypnosis involves a distinct altered mental state have been going on 
throughout the whole history of hypnosis (Kirsch, 2011), occasionally leading to experimental results. 
For example, in a recent elegant study that contributed to the state theory (i.e., considering that in 
some cases hypnosis may involve a special state), Kallio et al. (2011) have linked involuntary saccadic 
eye movements to a qualitatively different special state in one highly hypnotizable subject. A similar 
debate within the hypnosis research community concerns whether a narrow or a broad definition of 
hypnosis should be used; while the narrow definition includes a necessary trance induction procedure, 
the broad definition does not (Kirsch et al., 2011). 
Besides searching for the neural correlates of hypnosis, a notable number of studies have 
attempted to find out reliable correlates of hypnotic susceptibility, in order to predict subjects’ 
responsiveness in advance. Cognitive abilities that have been shown to correlate with hypnotizability 
are, e.g., absorption (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), fantasy proneness (Lynn & Rhue, 1988), and empathy 
(Wickramasekera II & Szlyk, 2003). Behavioral indicators of hypnotizability are more difficult to 
estimate, even though self-scoring of own behavior during hypnosis has been proven to strongly 
correlate with observer-scored behavior (Bentler & Hilgard, 1963).  
In ASC research, it seems also feasible to explore hypnosis by comparing its similarities and 
differences with other self-describable 'mindbody states' (this excellent term was coined by Thomas B. 
Roberts in connection with his Multistate Theory (2013), in order to avoid the ambiguous common 
language expression of 'SoC'). On the basis of imagination and visualization involved in a non-alert, 
drowsy state, the experience of hypnosis has been occasionally described as 'dream-like' (for a 
comparison, see e.g., Hobson, 2002, pp. 98-101). However, significant neurophysiological differences 
between dreaming during sleep and hypnosis during wakefulness make this particular resemblance 
hard to utilize in practical research. For this reason, in our Study II (Móró, Noreika, Kallio, & Revonsuo, 
2011a), not sleep but a somewhat resembling physiological state, drowsiness during daytime 
sleepiness, was chosen for comparison with hypnosis. It is to be noted also here that hypnosis may also 
share common mechanisms with another interesting ASC, meditation, via top-down modulation of 
attention and de-automatization processes (Lifshitz, Campbell, & Raz, 2012). 
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3.5 Psychedelic drugs 
The utilization of various psychoactive substances for a myriad of reasons has been an 
apparent characteristic of human behavior and culture for millennia (Baker, 1994; Winkelman, 1995). 
There seem to be no clear dividing lines, but only temporally and geographically changing agreements 
on definitions of concepts like 'food', 'spice', 'medicine', and 'drug'—neither is there a simple answer to 
the question "why people use drugs?". Mind-altering substances (in particular, anesthetics and 
hallucinogens) may be highly relevant to be used in scientific experiments for studying consciousness – 
but studying the general human use of mind-altering substances may also be equally fascinating in 
itself. In particular, the non-drug factors set and setting (Zinberg, 1984) – simply put, personal attitudes 
and the environment of drug use, respectively – seem to play key roles in modulating the experience. 
Within the last decade, psychedelic drug research has become a rapidly developing area in 
consciousness science, and it is also increasingly connecting with cognitive neuroscience. Recently, a 
handful of clinical trials have delivered excellent results in using psilocybin for tobacco smoking 
cessation (Johnson, Garcia-Romeu, & Griffiths, 2017), treating patients with 3,4-methylenedioxy-
methamphetamine (MDMA) in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Mithoefer, Wagner, Mithoefer, 
Jerome, & Doblin, 2011), giving LSD for end-of-life anxiety in terminally ill people (Gasser, Kirchner, & 
Passie, 2015), or administering ketamine to alleviate symptoms of treatment-resistant depression 
(Zarate et al., 2006). After 30-40 years of legally unobstructed but practically halted research 
worldwide, the current 'Psychedelic Renaissance' (Sessa, 2012) has already made substantial 
contributions to the understanding of brain mechanisms during drug-induced ASC, as neuroimaging 
studies on the effect of psychedelics in healthy human subjects have become increasingly permitted 
and performed in the last few years (Roseman, Leech, Feilding, Nutt, & Carhart-Harris, 2014; Schartner, 
Carhart-Harris, Barrett, Seth, & Muthukumaraswamy, 2017; Tagliazucchi, Carhart-Harris, Leech, Nutt, 
& Chialvo, 2014). These studies aim to discover neural correlates of the psychedelic state, to integrate 
this newly obtained knowledge into existing conceptual frameworks, as well as to hypothesize new 
theories that explain the mechanisms of consciousness and its alterations. 
Such a new theory of conscious states informed by neuroimaging research with psychedelic 
drugs is the entropic brain hypothesis (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014) that is based on brain connectivity 
data obtained from fMRI and MEG studies with psilocybin. The authors concluded that for the mind–
brain to enter into a primary disorganized ASC, the normally highly organized neurodynamic activity in 
the default mode network (DMN) must collapse and decouple from the medial temporal lobes. 
Another, but similarly neuroimaging-based interesting effort is Gallimore’s (2015) explanatory 
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modeling of the psychedelic state, based on the conceptual framework of a foremost contemporary 
theory of consciousness, namely the IIT (Oizumi, et al., 2014; Tononi, 2004). The new model suggests 
that while cognitive flexibility, creativity, and imagination are indeed enhanced in the psychedelic 
state, this happens at the expense of cause-effect information, as the brain’s ability "to organize, 
categorize, and differentiate the constituents of conscious experience" is impaired. 
There is a wide consensus that scientific research with psychedelic drugs seems to have a 
considerable – and so far very underexplored – potential for studying human consciousness in novel 
ways. For instance, Crick and Koch’s (2005) theory about the claustrum playing a key role in 
consciousness becomes even more interesting given the fact that the consciousness-altering 
hallucinogenic plant Salvia divinorum’s main ingredient salvinorin A is a strong agonist of κ-opioid 
receptors that are found in the claustrum in high density (Stiefel, Merrifield, & Holcombe, 2014). 
The context of neuroscientific and psychological experiments provides only one particular and 
highly controlled set and setting for drug use, with a sole purpose to obtain data by measurements 
and/or (self-)observation of subjects. On the contrary, drug use situations 'out there' 'in the real world' 
are characterized by extremely complex combinations of drugs and drug use purposes. Hence, studying 
drug use may offer excellent opportunities also for other disciplines like anthropology, cultural studies, 
ethnography, humanities, and social sciences to make interdisciplinary contributions in order to 
understand drugs; not only on neurobiological and psychological, but also on social and cultural levels. 
The phenomenology of drug-induced ASC is much understudied, despite of an abundance of 
experience reports and public discussion readily available online (Barratt, 2012). For a more detailed 
investigation of exceptional mental states, concepts of transpersonal psychology may also be involved 
(Maslow, 1969). Subjects may describe their experiences as transcendental, religious, and spiritual; in 
such sacramental use contexts, psychedelic drugs are termed 'entheogens' (literally: "becoming divine 
within") (Roberts, 2001; Ruck, Bigwood, Staples, Ott, & Wasson, 1979; Schultes & Hofmann, 1979). 
Interpretations of these experiences may get a deeper meaning by expanding the currently 
utilized bio-psycho-social scheme with a 'spiritual' level of explanation (Bishop, 2009). In this new four-
level scheme, the notion of spirituality refers to certain belief systems that are usually based on 
personally meaningful, direct subjective experiences of the transpersonal kind. Thus, an inclusion of 
the level of spirituality claims no objective existence of non-material metaphysical dimensions (along 
with populating mind-independent entities), but is merely used to denote an abstract human concept 
system with substantial explanatory power regarding cognition and behavior. These topics will be 
further discussed below in Studies III and IV. 
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4 AIMS 
Albeit the topic of this doctoral dissertation is ASC, the four included articles indeed show 
variability in their approaches and themes. However, the studies can be tied together under the term 
of 'cognitively and pharmacologically induced ASC', which is to be differentiated from spontaneously or 
pathologically occurring ASC. The first thing to be pointed out is that the notion of ASC is not defined 
clearly and consensually, but it refers to a group of diverse phenomena that are either included in or 
excluded from various lists. Furthermore, there are still ongoing debates on whether or not certain 
phenomena qualify as a state. Besides one theoretical article addressing the definitions of ASC, this 
thesis is also looking at the relationship between ASC phenomena with an empirical study. Two 
additional articles of the thesis survey and clarify the great variability that may occur between subjects 
during certain ASC (within a special cultural context). 
The above mentioned general objectives of the thesis can be further narrowed down to 
specific one-per-study research objectives, as follows: 
1) To construct a working definition for ASC that could yield a technical conceptualization and 
operationalization procedure to solve the selection–definition ordering problem. 
2) To investigate the relationship between distinct ASC, in particular between hypnotic 
susceptibility and daytime sleepiness. 
3) To study psychosocial factors that are associated with self-perceived benefits, such as 
enhanced coping, in drug-induced ASC experiences related to spirituality. 
4) To provide evidence that could support a distinctive categorization of sacramentally and 
spiritually used hallucinogenic drugs, compared with other biopsychosocial functions of the use of 
other drugs. 
Given the diverse types of the four included articles (a theoretical, an empirical, 
a survey-based, and a commentary), their order of appearance in this thesis has no particular 
significance. Therefore, they are being introduced in the original chronological order of publication, 
which may hence reflect merely my scientific research and writing process, not any logically 
consecutive arrangement. 
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5 ORIGINAL STUDIES 
5.0 General overview  
Studies I, II, III, and IV in this dissertation explore various ASC, from hypnosis to psychoactive 
and psychedelic drug use. These selected topics are admittedly only a narrow subset of the numerous 
phenomena generally regarded as ASC. Other important ASC, such as dreaming, anesthesia and 
meditation, are indeed also greatly interesting from consciousness studies’ point of view. In general, 
the four studies are connected by their common aim to investigate various aspects of induced ASC. 
Scientifically challenging problems are the definition(s) of ASC, relationship between distinct ASC, 
differentiating factors between same-type ASC, human purposes to utilize ASC, and the usability of 
certain ASC for consciousness research. As it would be practically impossible to study all the above 
mentioned aspects for each above mentioned, my studies are selectively addressing some aspects 
within a certain ASC, while omitting other aspects within another ASC—or comparing only a few ASC 
(not all of them) with each other. For broader background, Study I gives a thorough overview of ASC 
and hallucinations, Study II introduces the topic of hypnosis, and Study III describes psychedelics in 
more detail. 
Study I ("Hallucinatory Altered States of Consciousness") is a theoretical analysis on certain 
concepts and definitions of ASC and hallucinations; it proposes a working definition of a hallucinatory 
ASC, and a 'self-mapping' stepwise operationalization procedure for a systematic ASC comparison. 
Study II ("Hypnotizability, Sleepiness, and Subjective Experience") describes an empirical study 
that found significant positive correlations between hypnotic susceptibility and habitual/instantaneous 
sleepiness in 90 subjects by one newly developed and three previously established self-rating scales. 
Study III ("Coping, Life Purpose, and Spirituality in Psychedelic Drug Users") is based on an 
online questionnaire survey of 667 psychoactive drug users, concluding that psychedelic drug use with 
the purpose of autognosis (self-knowledge) is associated with higher scores of coping and spirituality. 
Study IV ("Sacramental and Spiritual Use of Hallucinogenic Drugs") is a commentary article 
arguing that sacramentally and spiritually used psychedelic drugs ('entheogens') are not merely used 
for altering perception, but deserve their own category in a drug instrumentalization framework.
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5.1 Study I: Hallucinatory Altered States of Consciousness 
(Móró, 2010), see full-text in the Original Publications section. 
5.1.1 Literature overview 
Dreaming, hypnosis, meditation, and other non-ordinary hallucinatory states are commonly 
referred to as ASC—in the lack of exclusive selections or commonly accepted definitions of what an 
ASC exactly is. ASC listings mentioned in the literature are rather exemplary than comprehensive (e.g., 
Farthing, 1992; Tart, 1975/2001; Vaitl, et al., 2013). Moreover, ASC definitions miss to provide exact 
classification criteria for assessing altered – as opposed to baseline – states of consciousness. There is 
still a rather common basis from cognitive science’s point of view on the question of what subsystems, 
dimensions, or elements of consciousness are being altered in an ASC (e.g., Farthing, 1992; Hobson, 
2007; Tart, 1975/2001), despite differences in both naming and the number of items enlisted. 
ASC are particularly interesting from the viewpoint of subjective experiences. The 
phenomenal level of description is about the ongoing first-person experience, described and referred 
to as the stream of consciousness (James, 1902), the what-is-it-like-to-be feeling (Nagel, 1974), or as 
inner presence (Revonsuo, 2006). The classical ASC literature describes alteration mechanisms with 
terms and models from cognitive psychology and neuropharmacology: temporary destabilizing and 
repatterning activity on the individual’s default pattern-making processes (Tart, 1975/2001), distinct 
alterations in neurotransmitter levels at certain locations in the prefrontal cortex (Hobson, 2002), or 
disinhibitory mechanisms in serotonergic pathways of cortico-striato-thalamic brain areas 
(Vollenweider & Geyer, 2001).  
Definitions of 'hallucination' are as manifold as those of ASC, incorporating references to the 
sensory domain, concepts of an external–internal distinction, and the notion of trueness (Esquirol, 
1845/1965; Horowitz, 1975; VandenBos, 2007). Contemporary research (Aleman & Larøi, 2008) defines 
'hallucination' as "conscious sensory experience that occurs in the absence of corresponding external 
stimulation of the relevant sensory organ and has a sufficient sense of reality to resemble a veridical 
perception". This approach considers hallucinations – regardless of opposing psychological or medical 
viewpoints – on their continuity with normal experience (Aleman & Larøi, 2008). 
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5.1.2 Original proposal 
Study I (Móró, 2010) is a theoretical article that (a) performs a multi-part conceptual analysis 
of certain aspects of hallucinatory ASC, (b) contributes a working definition of ASC, and (c) proposes a 
stepwise operationalization procedure to capture, filter, and group relevant ASC phenomena. Starting 
with commonalities found in current definitions of ASC, issues with self-evaluation, sources of data, 
and baseline comparison are analyzed first, then the concept of alterations is examined with respect to 
temporal dynamics, change mechanisms, and mental subsystems. After this, hallucinatory phenomena 
are discussed – regarding their various definitions, the relationship between external and internal, and 
the 'trueness' issue of hallucinations – and a technically based working definition of ASC is contributed. 
Conclusive to the analysis, a stepwise operationalization procedure is proposed. 
The analysis concludes that division between changed sensory experience ('hallucinations') 
and cognitive experience ('delusions') is unclear, and therefore consciousness alteration should be 
assessed from a broader perspective, i.e., with respect to all mental subsystems that may change 
during an ASC. It also concludes that external and internal are not alternatives to or independent from 
each other. Rather, they are mutually interacting stages in the information processing mechanisms: 
external information is always processed internally, but at the same time, exteroception is 
fundamentally modulated by internal processes, such as attention, memory, and emotion.  
The study concluded with a temporary working definition of ASC as: “A hallucinatory altered 
state of consciousness is a transiently stable mode of operation on supervenient levels in the mind–
brain complex, where objectively detectable characteristic changes in the internal information 
processing mechanisms of neurocognitive subsystems may be subjectively experienced as changes in 
phenomenal content and overall psychological functioning, as compared with prior and posterior 
baseline states of the individual.” This definition may conceptually guide the process of searching for 
ASC candidate phenomena: it includes a temporal dimension, addresses the dilemma of considering 
long-lasting changes of consciousness as an ASC, extends the level of view from psychological to 
neurocognitive, and involves a quantifiable comparison of individual prior/ posterior baseline SoC. 
As a theoretical solution for the mutually exclusive 'selection–definition ordering problem' 
described earlier, Study I proposes a stepwise operationalization procedure (that is yet to be carried 
out in practice by future studies). By this 'self-mapping' procedure, alterations of mental subsystems 
are quantified in first-person subjective experience reports that describe ASC candidate phenomena. 
From median values in each dimension for each ASC candidate, multidimensional distances can be 
computed to describe the core ASC typicalities, thus to result in a final grouping of ASC phenomena. 
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5.2 Study II: Hypnotizability, Sleepiness, and Subjective Experience 
(Móró, et al., 2011a), see full-text in the Original Publications section. 
5.2.1 Aims and methods 
Study II aimed to investigate the relationship between hypnotizability and three aspects of 
sleep: habitual daytime sleepiness, increased instantaneous drowsiness (after the hypnotic procedure), 
and night sleep quality. We also examined whether self-scored subjective experiences may provide 
additional data on hypnotizability that would not be detected by standard self-scored behavior. 
A total of 90 volunteer participants (71 females, 19 males) attended one of the four sessions 
of a hypnotic induction procedure that was played from pre-recorded audio. Before the procedure, 
participants were asked to mark their current (pre-test) state of sleepiness on the Karolinska 
Sleepiness Scale (KSS) form. After the 45-minute session, subjects were asked to score their post-test 
state of sleepiness on another KSS form, and to fill the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility 
Form A (HGSHS:A) and our own novel Questionnaire on Subjective Hypnotic Experiences (QSHE). In 
addition, subjects were asked to score the online versions of the Epworth Sleepiness Scale (ESS) and 
the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI) at their homes shortly after the session. 
5.2.2 Results and conclusions 
The main findings show that hypnotizability correlates positively with both habitual daytime 
sleepiness and instantaneous sleepiness after the hypnotic procedure. We found a significant habitual 
daytime sleepiness difference in ESS scores between lower and upper halves of the HGSHS:A total 
score group, and a significant instantaneous sleepiness difference between KSS pre-test and post-test 
scores in HGSHS:A mediums, lows, and all participants. Results support the idea that sleep and 
hypnosis may share some common mechanisms that may be related to the ability to quickly change 
the psychophysiological set into a more relaxed one, or to dedicate a sufficient amount of attention to 
immersing into less externally driven mental content. Results also indicated that subjective self-
evaluation by the novel QSHE correlated strongly and positively with the standard HGSHS:A scale. 
Moreover, QSHE even found a significant correlation in KSS post-test scores that HGSHS:A did not find; 
this indicates that hypnosis-related self-evaluation may be a useful tool in some cases when comparing 
with other subjectively rated scales, such as those concerning sleepiness. Thus, our findings justify the 
use of subjective self-evaluation methods when experiencing phenomena that have been traditionally 
evaluated by various observational and/or behavioral methods. 
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5.3 Study III: Coping, Life Purpose, and Spirituality in Psychedelic Drug Users 
(Móró, Simon, Bárd, & Rácz, 2011b), see full-text in the Original Publications section. 
5.3.1 Aims and methods 
Study III aimed to investigate psychedelic drug use in connection with the themes of coping, 
life purpose, and spirituality, as historical and anecdotal evidence pointed to such relationship in non-
problematic, autognostic (self-knowledge increasing) drug users. In an online questionnaire survey, we 
collected a total of 667 answers from respondents who had previously used or currently used 
psychedelic and/or other psychoactive drugs. After excluding respondents with self-assessed drug use 
problems, 589 subjects (247 females, 342 males; age M = 23.8, SD = 6.4) were taken into further 
analyses. Coping, life purpose, and spirituality were measured with the Psychological Immune 
Competence Inventory (PICI), the Purpose in Life (PIL) test, and the Intrinsic Spirituality Scale (ISS), 
respectively. Based on drug types, drug use purposes, and the importance of the experience, a 
PSYNDEX (psychedelic index) score was computed for 277 participants. By this score, we separated the 
target PSY group (autognostic psychedelic drug users) from the C1 control group (users of mostly other 
drugs for mostly other purposes) and from the C2 control group (alcohol-and-tobacco-only users). Fifty 
members from each group were matched by age, type of residence, and highest educational level. 
5.3.2 Results and conclusions 
Results indicated that the use of psychedelic drugs with a purpose to enhance self-knowledge 
was less associated with problems, and correlated positively with both coping (PSYNDEX–PICI: r = .137, 
p < .01, n = 366) and spirituality (PSYNDEX–ISS: r = .339, p < .001, n = 277). As verified by a 
Mann-Whitney test, matched ISS scores in the PSY target group were also significantly higher in 
comparison with control groups C1 (U = 689, Z = −3.870, p < .001, N = 100) and C2 (U = 697.5, 
Z = −3.811, p < .001, N = 100). PIL scores correlated negatively with the total number of drug types 
used (r = −.144, p < .001, N = 589) and with the number of nonpsychedelic drugs used (r = −.124, 
p < .01, N = 589), but did not correlate with the number of psychedelic drugs used. 
Albeit the meaning of the term 'spirituality' may be ambiguous, it seems that a spiritually 
inclined attitude in drug use may act as a protective factor against drug-related problems. The 
autognostic use of psychedelic drugs may be thus hypothesized as a 'training situation' that promotes 
self-enhancement by rehearsing personal coping strategies and by gaining self-knowledge. 
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5.4 Study IV: Sacramental and Spiritual Use of Hallucinogenic Drugs 
(Móró & Noreika, 2011), see full-text in the Original Publications section. 
5.4.1 Literature overview 
Study IV is an open peer commentary on a proposed new framework theory for non-addictive 
psychoactive drug use (Müller & Schumann, 2011). The target article introduces the concept of 
drug instrumentalization, i.e., the idea that humans are deliberately changing their mental states by 
drugs, "in order to facilitate other, non-drug-related behaviors" (p. 293). In their approach, Müller and 
Schumann consider non-addictive drug consumption as a "stable and widespread behavior in its own 
right" (p. 293), which is a rare and welcomed standpoint in the predominantly problem-oriented field 
of drug studies. 
Müller and Schumann (2011) argue that "drug instrumentalization behavior may provide a 
functional adaptation to modern environments based on a historical selection for learning mechanisms 
that allow the dynamic modification of consummatory behavior" (p. 293). Elaborating this concept, the 
target article lists an eight-item classification of the proximate mechanisms of psychoactive drug use. 
In this classification, hallucinogenic drugs are generally associated with changes in perception and 
cognition, thus thought to be consumed primarily for their sensory perception changing properties. 
5.4.2 Original proposal 
In our open peer commentary (Móró & Noreika, 2011, p. 319), we argued that "[...] the 
religious use of hallucinogenic drugs stems from a human search of metaphysical insight rather than 
from a direct need for cognitive, emotional, social, physical, or sexual improvement". In support of our 
view, we enlisted archeological evidence and historical documentation suggesting that hallucinogenic 
psychoactive drugs have been used for ritual and ceremonial purposes around the world and across 
the ages. Therefore, "the sacramental and spiritual intake of hallucinogenic drugs goes so far beyond 
other biopsychosocial functions that it deserves its own category in the drug instrumentalization list". 
5.4.3 Conclusion 
In their authors’ response, Müller and Schumann accepted our idea: "We fully agree with this 
suggestion and add this as ninth instrumentalization goal to the list as: Facilitating spiritual and 
religious activities" (p. 330). As our proposal managed to extend their initial eight-item 
instrumentalization list, we feel contended with our article resulting in a significant impact on this 
professional debate. 
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5.5 Citations of the studies 
As of June 2016, it could be of academic relevance to review some of the papers that have 
been citing the four Original Publications since their first publication dates in 2010 and 2011. The 
following brief review is meant to demonstrate the international contribution of my studies on later 
research; moreover, it may also serve as a brief update to the present directions of the studied topics. 
An automatically updated online list of citing articles is being maintained by Google Scholar Citations 
(2017); in order to avoid circular citations, the citing papers will not be cited here. 
Study I ("Hallucinatory Altered States of Consciousness") has 10 citations to date. It has been 
referred to in a former colleague’s (current supervisor’s) PhD thesis and in one of his online 
publications about the neural correlates of a state of consciousness. The study was also cited in the 
context of the experience of ASC in shamanic ritual, in a book about the origins of religion in the 
Paleolithic, and in a paper about phantasy and the phenomenological significance of ASC. It was also 
mentioned in a publication about medieval steam lodge rituals among American Indians, and in a 
master’s thesis about 'Autonomous Cephalocaudal Paresthesia' (also called Autonomous Sensory 
Meridian Response), a euphoric tingling sensation that starts from the back of the head. In connection 
with hallucinations, citations were also made in a philosophy of science journal, in an online philosophy 
paper (in Polish), and in a master’s thesis in philosophy about drug instrumentalization (in Czech). 
Study II ("Hypnotizability, Sleepiness, and Subjective Experience") has 3 citations to date. 
Besides being referred to in the above mentioned PhD thesis of the supervisor, it was also cited in a 
Mexican master’s thesis about the effect of hypnotherapy on sleep quality in women with breast 
cancer (in Spanish), and in a Finnish master’s thesis about the effects of scale and order of 
administration on suggestibility testing (in Finnish). 
Study III ("Coping, Life Purpose, and Spirituality in Psychedelic Drug Users") has become a 
'flagship' of my publications by 33 citations to date. Of these, there are two self-citations: a paper that 
reviews the main subject pool for Study III (i.e., the Hungarian Psychedelic Community, 'Daath'), and 
another about harm reduction of NPS use. The themes of the top three citing articles (that are now 
more cited than my Study III paper) include the hallucinogenic effects of salvinorin A in humans, the 
association of classic psychedelic use with reduced psychological distress, and the factor analysis of the 
Mystical Experience Questionnaire. Other citing papers are about self-experimentations with 
psychedelics among mental health professionals in the former Czechoslovakia, drug use and harm 
reduction in the Goa trance scene in Belgium, and purpose in life of college students in the Midwestern 
USA. Interestingly, a further citing article of Study III touches the topic of entoptic images and 
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phosphenes; the latter topic was covered also by one of our TMS studies in a research project and 
yielded a publication for my colleagues. Journal citations were also made in connection with topics 
such as mental health consequences of hallucinogen use in self-identified spiritual contexts, the 'e-
psychonaut' subculture and its NPS use, and the potential of psychedelics in healthcare from a 
neurophenomenological viewpoint. The paper was cited by a US doctoral thesis that studied the first-
person hermeneutic phenomenology of the lived experience in persons using shamanic sacred plant 
mind–body medicines, and listed in an Argentine doctoral monograph (in Spanish). In an academic 
book about religion and spirituality across cultures, the paper was cited in a chapter on the topics of 
mindfulness, consciousness, spirituality, and well-being. (Other citing papers have not been cited so 
far, and are omitted from this enlisting.) 
Study IV ("Sacramental and Spiritual Use of Hallucinogenic Drugs") has 3 citations to date. The 
most cited of these three articles describes findings of an international drug survey on harms and 
benefits associated with psychoactive drugs. The topics of the second citing journal article are 
ayahuasca, psychedelic studies, and health sciences; the third citing paper is a review article from 
Mexico, on the transdisciplinarity among neurosciences and religions (in Spanish). 
In conclusion, the international influence of the Original Publications seems to point to an 
existing academic interest in the topics of altered consciousness, hallucinations, and particularly 
psychedelics. Indeed, the latest 'psychedelic renaissance' has been characterized by an increasing 
academic collaboration between resourceful and well-funded institutions worldwide. Similarly, many 
topics within the wide spectrum of ASC phenomena could be also drawn together from separate 
sources. The growing number of academic thesis works (from BA and MA degrees up to doctoral level) 
indicates also the need for educating and supervising an emerging new generation of ASC researchers. 
Given the many subfields, a multidisciplinary approach toward the topics of altered consciousness, 
hallucinations, and psychedelics are to be emphasized; for a confluence, academic educational efforts 
(such as doctoral programs and summer schools) could be well warranted. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
Hallucinatory ASC are scientifically and philosophically intriguing mindbody states, with a 
promise to shed light on certain core mechanisms of consciousness (in where the term 'consciousness' 
refers to the phenomenal level of organization in the brain, describable by subjective experiences). The 
'science of subjectivity', based on first-person approaches like neurophenomenology, has recently 
become an accepted field within cognitive neuroscience and consciousness research. Personal 
accounts of exceptional experiences during ASC – no matter if not objectively observable as direct 
behavior of the subject – can indeed serve as valid data, once approached with rigorous scientific 
methodology that takes into account various confounding factors of reporting (including 
confabulations, sense-making explanations, individual metaphysical beliefs, cultural contexts, etc.). 
Contributing theoretical work and empirically based scientific results of the thesis are detailed below. 
6.1 Theoretical implications 
In the field of hallucinatory ASC, theoretical work in Study I concentrates on 'technical' issues, 
such as definitions, listings, and the use of notions regarding the concepts. The approach is rather from 
a cognitive psychology viewpoint, and not from that of traditional ASC-contributing disciplines, such as 
philosophy of mind, clinical psychology, or psychiatry. By a theoretically developed working definition, 
a hallucinatory ASC is a "metastable mode of operation on supervenient levels in the mind–brain 
complex, where objectively detectable characteristic changes in internal information processing 
mechanisms of neurocognitive subsystems are subjectively experienced as changes in phenomenal 
content and overall psychological functioning". Unlike other definitions that use objective 'reality' for 
comparison, the contributed working definition of hallucinations accepts the validity of subjective 
experiences, and it places ASC into a timeframe to be compared with its immediately preceding and 
subsequent SoC. For solving the 'selection–definition ordering problem' (i.e., whether to define ASC 
based on selected phenomena, or to select phenomena as ASC based on a definition), a stepwise 
operationalization procedure is proposed. In order to describe the core ASC typicalities, this 
'self-mapping' procedure examines first-person subjective experience reports, quantifies alterations of 
mental subsystems in ASC candidate phenomena, and computes multidimensional distances from 
median values in each dimension for each ASC candidate. Albeit not carried out in practice in Study I, 
the proposed stepwise operationalization procedure is described in sufficient detail to be open for 
other researchers to implement in the future, hopefully in the form of a fruitful research collaboration. 
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In the field of hypnosis studies, the results of the empirical Study II add to the rather marginal 
subfield of comparative hypnosis research, where the word 'comparative' is used in the sense of 
comparing other ASC with the hypnotic state (or nonstate, depending on conceptualization). 
Similarities and differences between two ASC can be measured on the subjective, behavioral, and 
physiological levels, including possibly neurophysiological and brain imaging methods as well as eye 
movement tracking. Relatively few trait or state characteristics that predict hypnotic susceptibility 
have been identified so far, therefore finding new ones, such as sleepiness, is welcome. In particular, 
research on new traits – for instance, sleepiness – that are related to other ASC can contribute also to 
comparative ASC studies, so it is even more welcome from the perspective of consciousness science. 
Our newly developed QSHE instrument for subjective self-scoring of hypnotic response has been 
proven useful by this empirical hypnosis study in 90 subjects, therefore appears worthy of further 
applications. Results indicate that hypnotizability (measured by HGSHS:A) correlates positively with 
both habitual daytime sleepiness (measured by ESS) and instantaneous sleepiness after the hypnotic 
procedure (measured by post-test KSS). These findings are thought to hint that sleep and hypnosis may 
share common, putatively neurobiological mechanisms regarding transitions between ASC. Shedding 
light in more detail on the nature of this connection would require various individual chartings of 
subjects regarding e.g., their sleep habits, cortical connections, and neurochemical characteristics. 
In the field of psychedelic drug research, Study III represents the minority among general drug 
studies in its goal to find out about self-reported positive experiences of drug use. This approach is in 
contrast with the majority of psychoactive drug studies that experiment on the receptor-level, describe 
analytical drug detection methods, involve animal behavior research, report cases of adverse effects, 
or survey populations of problematic drug users. Our findings on autognostic psychedelic drug use add 
to a growing body of evidence from lately revived psychedelic studies indicating non-problematic lay 
drug use (Krebs & Johansen, 2013; Pisano et al., 2017), efficient clinical applications (Grob, Bossis, & 
Griffiths, 2013; Morgan, McAndrew, Stevens, Nutt, & Lawn, 2017), and enhanced psychological 
benefits (Friedman, 2006; Letheby, 2015). Increasing recognition of the vast potential of psychedelics – 
along with their very low level of risk – seems to slowly undermine the current prohibition-oriented 
drug policy regime regarding hallucinogenic substances (Haden, Emerson, & Tupper, 2016), pointing 
out a need for their legal reclassification. Thus, a theoretical implication of this study is its contribution 
to the evidence base that should ideally guide political decisions of drug control—as opposed to 
current ideologically driven 'drug war' measures that are not only counterproductive to public health, 
but may occasionally also disrespect (or even violate) basic human rights. 
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In the field of sacramental and spiritual drug use studies, the short commentary of Study IV 
summarizes evidence for a millennia-long drug use within religious or spiritual settings. In their target 
article, Müller and Schumann (2011) enlisted eight proximate mechanisms of psychoactive drug use: 
(1) Improved social interaction; (2) Facilitated sexual behavior; (3) Improved cognitive performance 
and counteracting fatigue; (4) Facilitated recovery from and coping with psychological stress; (5) Self-
medication for mental problems; (6) Sensory curiosity – Expanded perception horizon; (7) Euphoria, 
hedonia, and high; and (8) Improved physical appearance and attractiveness. Our arguments 
contributed substantially to the theory of drug instrumentalization by convincing the original authors 
to expand their list with a hallucinogen-specific item: (9) Facilitating spiritual and religious activities. 
This theoretical advancement was made possible by a broadly based approach to drug studies: 
supporting evidence was gathered from the disciplines of humanistic psychology, religious studies, 
ethnobotany, cross-cultural medicine, and psychotherapy. The achieved success in providing a wider 
perspective on an important drug topic can be attributed to the multidisciplinary attitude learned from 
the fields of both cognitive neuroscience (in general) and consciousness science (in particular). 
6.1.1 Theory synthesis: 'virtual realism' 
When carrying out theoretical or practical ASC research, it is extremely easy to get fascinated 
by the observation of how state changes between two very different SoC can occur within short time 
periods in the very same mind–brain complex of the same individual. Or, how unexpectedly different 
state changes may occur after applying similar induction methods to different individuals. These 
observations, along with the causal power of subjective reality, point towards considering the mind–
brain complex as a world-simulator, and justify the use of the technological metaphor of virtual reality 
for phenomenal consciousness (Metzinger, 2003, p. 25). Loosely building on the metaphor of a 
'brain-in-a-vat', concepts of virtualism have been put forward in various, e.g., presentational 
(Revonsuo, 1995), enactive (Noë, 2004), or representational (Clowes & Chrisley, 2012) forms. In 
particular, the phenomenon of dreaming has been strongly considered as a simulation by, e.g., the 
Threat Simulation Theory (Revonsuo, 2000c) and the Social Simulation Theory (Revonsuo, Tuominen, & 
Valli, 2016). 
By modern technological analogs, the world-simulator concept assumes a VR generator that 
operates within a brain (as a 'hardware') and a mind (as an 'operation system'), and produces a 
transparent experience of presence within a subjective reality (as an 'application'). Hence, the concept 
of VR in the context of ASC is more than a convenient metaphor: it also provides a paradigm to explore 
the phenomenon of consciousness by studying its alterations as 'parameters' or 'settings' of the virtual 
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world it just simulates as the subjective reality for a person. It is to be noted that the concept of 
virtualization involves the possibility of multiple instances of the something that is being virtualized. In 
computer examples: multiple virtual windows with different content can be shown on one physical 
display screen, or multiple virtual machines with different operation systems can be run on one 
physical computer hardware. However, in a consciousness-based VR simulation, the limitations of 
linear data processing and silicon-based physical machinery do not occur.  
It can be conceptualized that on the level of phenomenal consciousness, perceptions of the 
currently surrounding physical environment are processed into and represented also as a virtual 
environment. While this physical-perception-based virtual environment is special in the way that it is 
practically continuously present during wakefulness, it can indeed cease in the absence of immersive 
first-person spatio-temporal simulational phenomenality (e.g., during deep sleep, or dreamless REM 
sleep) (Windt, et al., 2016). It can be also replaced with a non-physical-perception-based, yet also fully 
immersive other virtual environment (e.g., in dreaming sleep, or complex closed-eye hallucinations). 
Open-eye hallucinations during wakefulness may present an intriguing third possibility, namely the 
partial overlap of the physically based virtual environment with a hallucinatory virtual environment, 
where a reciprocal interaction between physical and virtual elements can be also possible. 
This latter possibility resembles a currently emerging subset of VR that is termed augmented 
reality (AR), where bits of visual or textual information are linked on top of the visual presentation of 
the physical environment. The idea behind AR is to generate and present relevant information 
transparently while at the same time leaving the physical environment also perceivable (in contrast 
with VR that blocks the perception of the physical environment, and fully replaces it with a simulated 
one). In AR’s passive form, information is presented on top of the physical environment with no spatial 
correspondence. An example of this passive AR is the use of head-up display (HUD) technology by 
projecting instrument-generated data onto the windscreen of aircrafts. In a more advanced form of 
AR, physical space and its items are 'understood' via scanning and image processing methods by a 
computing unit, so that computer-generated virtual content can be transparently and exactly mapped 
on top of the digitally tracked physical environment. For example, moving brackets around a person’s 
face on the display screen of a digital camera are simple AR items computed in real-time. The 
technologically most advanced AR solutions – e.g., a viewer wearing transparent display glasses while 
walking around a 3D item that is projected on a table surface, perceiving it from different angles, and 
possibly also interacting with it – are increasingly being referred to as mixed reality (MR), albeit this 
latest term is not yet defined unambiguously. 
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The world-simulation concept can be exemplified by lucid dreaming (LD) and REM sleep 
behavior disorder (RBD). In LD, the dreamer gains metacognitive insight that his/her currently 
perceived, fully immersive phenomenal environment is not the surrounding (physical) environment, 
but 'just' a simulated (virtual) environment. In RBD, the dreamer’s motor behavior seems to be driven 
by the phenomenal environment, without the person being aware of the constrains of the physical 
environment. Simulated (virtual) environment can be 'taken as real': both regular and lucid dreams 
may go on with or without check-ups ('reality tests') for bizarre phenomena; both real and 
pseudohallucinations may persist with or without one’s cognizance of their hallucinatory nature. This 
may happen because self-reflection – including the ability to evaluate one’s own current SoC – is not 
required for experiencing an immersive (physical or virtual) phenomenal environment as 'real'.  
The 'flavor' of virtualism presented here is purposefully termed as virtual realism: it 
emphasizes both the technological connection with VR and the apparent realness of non-physically 
originated perception as the core subjective experience. The concept of virtual realism elaborates the 
idea that anything subjectively considered as real is the result of transparent information processing 
mechanisms on the phenomenal level of consciousness. Virtual realism applies to all subsystems of 
consciousness, including not only sensory perception (that in computer-based VR is overwhelmingly 
visual), but also other, technologically non-simulable, intangible features such as interoception, 
emotion, and sense of self. Moreover, abstract subjective experiences without any claimable 
counterparts in physical space – such as intuitive knowledge, entity encounters, sense of 
transcendence, etc. – are held to be virtually real; interestingly, these exceptional experiences are 
more likely related to ASC than to baseline SoC. Due to the potentially realistic nature and subsequent 
causal power of any subjective experience, the concept of virtual realism disregards the importance of 
whether a temporally preceding stimulus for that piece of experience has a (mental presentation of a) 
representational counterpart in physical space—albeit it often, but not necessarily, indeed has one. 
In summary, findings from various induced hallucinatory ASC support the concept that 
phenomenal-level consciousness is virtual: the continuous existence of internal information processing 
manifests as the subjective reality for the individual. Virtual realism points out also that the 
world-simulator accepts different degrees of correspondence, coherence, and immersiveness within 
the experienced environment. Deliberate manipulation of subjective experience sets and settings by 
psychologically, pharmacologically, and technologically induced hallucinatory ASC – e.g., hypnosis, 
hallucinogens, and VR – can be a naturally integrable and effective method for 'designing synthetic 
mindbody states' (Roberts, 2013), hence to extend human consciousness beyond current limitations. 
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6.1.2 ASC studies and the VR metaphor 
The connection between the four ASC studies and the VR metaphor deserves a detailed 
explanation, as follows: 
Study I pointed out that ASC are characterized by typical changes in the subsystems of 
consciousness, and hallucinations are results of changes in the information processing chain. Starting 
with two compiled lists of ASC candidate phenomena and mental subsystems, we can find, categorize, 
and quantify references to alterations of subsystems in first-person reports describing subjective 
experiences. By computing distances from median values in each dimension for each ASC candidate, 
we can then compute multidimensional distances that would describe the core ASC typicalities. Hence, 
typical changes of the consciousness subsystems during an ASC can be seen as typical parameters that 
describe a configuration of a simulated virtual world. By this above proposed stepwise 
operationalization procedure, the parameter space can be mapped: involved subsystems and their 
quantified changes can define a group of 'core' ASC phenomena. Thus, we can quantitatively define the 
parameters of a VR world-simulation within consciousness subsystems that are needed for a certain 
state to be subjectively experienced as an ASC instead of a baseline SoC. This knowledge could 
potentially open up novel methods to create artificial simulations of computer-based virtual realities 
that use psychological technologies to manipulate the subsystems of consciousness in order to achieve 
subjectively experienced ASC for the person immersed in a VR environment. 
Study II explored a relationship between two distinct SoC, hypnosis and sleepiness, and 
hypothetically explained the found correlation by broadly referring to certain shared neurobiological 
background mechanisms. These mechanisms may include, for instance, individually measurable 
quantities for the easiness to change the baseline SoC to an ASC, the persistence of that ASC, and the 
time to return back to the baseline SoC. The resulting numbers, if quantified, can be seen as the 
world-simulator’s meta-parameters that describe temporal patterns of the transition process between 
simulated virtual worlds. In this study, within-subject correlations between VR simulator 
meta-parameters (characterizing the transitions to/from a sleepy or hypnotic state) were found out. 
Study III shed light on the applicability of hallucinatory ASC, both as via self-induced 
procedures within various sets and settings, and as potential clinical therapeutic tools because of their 
inherent mechanisms to manipulate subjective reality in beneficial ways. In connection with 
psychedelics, the VR metaphor is applicable to hallucinatory ASC as 'simulator training situations'. 
Deliberately provoked temporary exceptional experiences may be utilized to rehearse coping 
strategies in novel, unusual, or straightforwardly 'chaotic' altered states, hence potentially helping to 
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gain self-knowledge about one’s mental functioning when facing unexpected non-ordinary states and 
situations. Moreover, the great variability in phenomenal outcomes – even when using the same types 
and amounts of substances by different persons under various sets and settings – emphasize the 
importance of non-drug factors, i.e., the internal parameters within one’s VR simulator.  
Study IV emphasized the importance of set and setting variables (beyond the pharmacological 
constants of a drug type and, partially, its dosage) in creating the complex and abstract contents of a 
virtual world. These variables include a large number of difficultly measurable parameters, such as 
attitudes, expectations, (sub)cultural contexts, goals, intentions, meanings, and even metaphysical 
assumptions based on individual religious and/or spiritual worldviews. The basic claim here is that the 
subjective experience is in no way a direct and predictable output of the type and quantity of a 
neuropsychopharmaceutical input (i.e., the ingested drug). Rather, mental contents and observable 
behavior during a psychedelics-induced ASC is highly unpredictable, unless taking into account the 
person’s prior set and setting, which may at least partially and coarsely predict some aspects of his/her 
experience. It is yet to be seen whether these non-drug parameters could be 'loaded' into a computer-
based VR simulator to achieve intended kinds of phenomenal experiences.  
6.2 Limitations and biases 
Findings could be argued to be theoretically limited and biased due to the underlying 
philosophical approach of biological realism that serves as a starting point for the concepts elaborated 
and the studies carried out. On a general level, studying subjective experiences by introspective verbal 
reports on conscious contents has several well-known limitations; items enlisted by Farthing (1992) – 
forgetting, reconstruction errors, verbal description difficulties, distortion through observation, 
censorship, experimental demands, and lack of independent verification – are all applicable here too. 
There are also many practical limitations of ASC research in particular, as the studied phenomena may 
manifest only rarely and not in all subjects (or not as expected), can be hard to measure by the usual 
research methods, or can even lead to difficult experiences for some subjects. 
Moreover, the researcher’s personal involvement in, interaction with, and experience of the 
studied community and topics could be also considered as a possibly biasing factor in evaluating 
'neutrality' toward the researched themes. Nevertheless, a researcher’s personal experience with 
hallucinatory ASC – such as dreaming, hypnosis, or psychedelics – could be conceived to work as an 
additional motivational factor that keeps up his/her interest in the chosen topics. Subjective 
experiences in the studied phenomena may indeed give extra insights, but obviously these insights 
should be handled as idiosyncratic pieces of subjective data that are definitely not generalizable to 
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draw any conclusions for the whole phenomenon at hand. It seems to be widely accepted within 
disciplines studying subjective phenomena that the only factor that counts scientifically is the proper 
application of rigorous methodology within high-quality research (as measured by accepted 
international peer-reviewed publications), and not the presence or absence of personal subjective 
experiences in the studied topics per se. The involvement of multiple investigators with various 
degrees of personal interest could also help maintain objectivity—or counterbalance subjectivity. 
6.3 Recommendations for further research 
The 'hallucinatory ASC' theoretical paper describes a stepwise operationalization procedure to 
chart ASC by a multidimensional mapping. Obviously, it is highly recommended for other researchers in 
this subfield to carry out the described procedure in order to obtain the first-ever theory-based 
practical classification of ASC. Thus, practical implications of the hallucinatory ASC paper could possibly 
contribute – albeit possibly only in a much further phase – to a stable definition and an agreed-upon 
classification system for ASC phenomena; with the help of the article’s theoretical input, a (nearly) 
definitive ASC list could be constructed. Other possible future research ideas would include a semantic 
analysis of the terms by which hallucinations are defined. This examination could well point out many 
flaws of mutual definitions, circular references, and loosely interpreted popular notions of 
'hallucination' that are nevertheless shaping the way we think about the whole phenomenon.  
The 'hypnosis vs. sleepiness' experiment points out that studying the fluctuating levels of 
daytime sleepiness and arousal could be another promising avenue of research that could further the 
understanding of hypnosis. Moreover, it indirectly suggests also the feasibility of exploring other 
'dream-like' states, e.g., the drowsy pre-sleep (hypnagogic) state, with further ASC-comparative 
hypnosis research. Findings from the hypnosis and drowsiness study may also be used in putting 
together a novel psychological instrument that measures hypnotic susceptibility traits by combining 
the most relevant core questions from various previous studies. Another easily implementable 
research idea would be the comparison of hypnotic susceptibility with meditation traits. This could be 
carried out simply by assessing the hypnotic suggestibility on a standard scale (like the HGSHS:A) in a 
group of long-term practicing meditators. Ideally, and in its simplest form, a mere correlation between 
the number of years spent by practicing (various kinds of) meditation and the scale-quantifiable 
hypnotizability score could hint at a relationship between these two ASC. Hypothetically, a long 
practice of going into a meditative state could have trained the person’s ASC-changing background 
mechanisms to speed up the transitional process, i.e., long-term meditators could be expected to be 
more susceptible to hypnotic suggestions and therefore to score higher on the susceptibility scale. 
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The 'psychonauts' online survey collected data to form a matrix of 23 drug types (actually, 
only 22 real drugs, plus the fictional sham drug 'Relevin') and 14 drug use purposes. Detailed 
relationships within this cross-table will be analyzed and described in an article currently under 
preparation; preliminary findings indicate that the major hallucinogens, such as LSD, mescaline, and 
Psilocybe spp. mushrooms, are most typically used for autognosis, such as self-medication, self-
knowledge, and religious/spiritual purposes. Further studies about psychedelics are recommended to 
touch the topic of the so-called 'bad trips' (consensually termed as 'difficult experiences' in the 
literature and among crisis intervention professionals), for instance by exploring and categorizing the 
underlying psychological and environmental factors that contribute to their initial negative 
considerations. Another very interesting line of forthcoming studies could be the investigation of the 
mechanisms by which those at-the-time negative experiences can be later interpreted as personally 
meaningful life events that carry a 'teaching' and become eventually useful for the person involved. 
The 'sacramental use of psychedelics' commentary article points out many serious and deep 
connections between certain 'drugs' and religion/spirituality. These are to be examined further with 
studies by disciplines within the humanities (e.g., anthropology, ethnography, cultural studies, 
theology, etc.). Relevant topics could include also law studies, as there are current exemptions from 
the international narcotics conventions regarding the use of certain hallucinogenic substances for 
religious purposes. Fundamentally, the (actually non-existent evidence base of the) background 
principles of the current drug prohibition regime can be questioned by pointing out that even the 
system itself does not consider all controlled psychoactive drugs as being unconditionally 'evil' per se, 
but accepts the possibility of their legal status—depending not on chemical structure, but use purpose. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 In conclusion, one-sentence summaries are compiled to capture the essence of each 
study and the doctoral thesis as a whole: 
 
I. A hallucinatory ASC is a metastable mode of operation on supervenient levels in the mind–
brain complex, where objectively detectable characteristic changes in internal information 
processing mechanisms of neurocognitive subsystems are subjectively experienced as 
changes in phenomenal content and overall psychological functioning (Study I, Section 5.1). 
 
II. Sleep and hypnosis may share common, putatively neurobiological mechanisms regarding 
transitions between ASC, as hypnotizability correlates positively with both habitual daytime 
sleepiness and instantaneous sleepiness after the hypnotic procedure (Study II, Section 5.2). 
 
III. Psychedelic drug use may facilitate the gain of self-knowledge by rehearsing personal coping 
strategies in exceptional mental situations, and it correlates positively with spirituality that 
may act as a protective factor against drug-related problems (Study III, Section 5.3). 
 
IV. Sacramental and spiritual use of hallucinogenic drugs for ritual and ceremonial purposes is 
associated with a human search for metaphysical insight, therefore having a distinct drug 
instrumentalization goal: to facilitate spiritual and religious activities (Study IV, Section 5.4). 
 
V. Hallucinatory ASC can be conceptualized as subjectively experienced virtual world-simulations 
running on the phenomenal level of the mind–brain complex, with uniquely configured 
parameters describing changes in subsystems of consciousness (Studies I-IV). 
 
VI. Virtual realism states that phenomenal-level consciousness experiences the continuous 
existence of its own internal information processing, and accepts it as the subjective reality 
with different degrees of correspondence, coherence, and immersiveness (Section 6.1.1). 
 
VII. Deliberate manipulation of subjective experience sets and settings by psychologically, 
pharmacologically, and technologically induced hallucinatory ASC can be an integrable and 
effective method to extend human consciousness beyond current limitations (Section 6.1.1). 
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